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I. Introduction 
Henry and Claire, newly arrived to the state, eagerly drive 
into the gated and well-adorned front entrance of the Beau 
Chateaux subdivision.1 With wide eyes, they marvel as they pass 
the carefully manicured lawns filled with meticulously pruned 
hedges, the architecturally pleasing homes on spacious lots, and 
the French chateau-style neighborhood community center, still in 
the early stages of construction, promise to feature a restaurant, 
tennis courts, a sprawling golf course, and a luxuriously 
ornamented swimming pool.2 The couple pulls into their driveway 
and smiles with satisfaction at the beauty, the quality, and the 
lifestyle that they have bought into when they purchased a home 
here in Beau Chateaux. They especially feel lucky to have gotten 
into this development in its early stages, attributing their great 
deal on the purchase price of their home to their timeliness. Both 
are confident that the many empty lots and pre-built homes 
throughout Beau Chateaux will soon be filled with residents just 
like them.3 
                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., We’re the Face of Poverty: This Is the Tale of Our Two Baton 
Rouges, BATON ROUGE BUS. REP. (Nov. 14, 2011), 
http://www.businessreport.com/article/were-the-face-of-poverty-this-is-the-tale-
of-our-two-baton-rouges (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (“That’s because readers of 
this publication tend to be business executives, tend to be in an upper-middle-
income bracket or higher, tend to be white and tend to live in faux French 
Country homes, many along Highland Road and almost all well south of Florida 
Boulevard.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 2. See generally Setha M. Low, The Edge and the Center: Gated 
Communities and the Discourse of Urban Fear, 103 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 45 
(2001) (describing the creation and aspects of American gated communities). 
 3. See MARY G. SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED COMMUNITIES IN THE 
UNITED STATES 29 (1999) (“They also speak about a feeling of community, or a 
friendly community, or having neighbors like themselves, where they feel ‘at 
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Neither Henry nor Claire has to worry about yard care, as 
others handle that service. Nor do they have to worry about 
continued construction of the community center, as that too is 
being taken care of. Next week there is scheduled to be a wine 
and cheese art walk in the neighborhood park, but Henry and 
Claire do not have to purchase tickets or worry about paying for 
the food or spirits at the event. All of these expenses are taken 
care of beforehand, not by the payment of their homeowner’s 
association dues, but rather through the payment of their annual 
ad valorem property tax bill.  
Importantly, Beau Chateaux is not just any private 
residential subdivision; rather, it has the special designation of 
being a special taxing district.4 The local city council has been 
feverish in its desire to lure innovative developers to the area and 
to spur growth in the local economy.5 In order to satisfy this 
economic development hunger, the city council agreed to create 
for the developer a special geographic designation, co-terminus 
with the property boundaries of Beau Chateaux, that would 
imbue a board of directors—appointed through a special statutory 
scheme—to charge annual property tax assessments against each 
of the individual parcels within the development.6 The board, 
whose members were appointed by the city council at the 
recommendation of the developer, then used the promise of the 
future revenues generated from these assessments to issue a 
substantial number of bonds, which were then sold to investors to 
raise capital for the project.7  
                                                                                                     
home.’”). 
 4. See generally 1 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATIONS § 2:33 (Clark A. Nichols et al. eds., 3d ed. 2013) (explaining the 
functions, purposes, and legal status of legislative special districts vis-à-vis 
municipal corporations). 
 5. See Christopher K. Odinet, Fairness, Equity, and a Level Playing Field: 
Development Goals for the Resilient City, 50 IDAHO. L. REV. 217, 220 (2014) 
(arguing that competition between cities to draw residents and to spur growth 
has increased since the Great Recession). 
 6. See generally 1 GELFAND, STATE AND LOCAL GOV’T DEBT FIN. § 11:17 (2d 
ed.) (discussing the history, purpose, function, and creation of special legislative 
districts). 
 7. See id. (“Today, special authorities and special districts finance, 
construct and operate a wide range of programs and facilities. Generally, their 
capital projects are financed by revenue bonds, which are usually backed by 
 
SUPER-LIENS TO THE RESCUE? 711 
The developer, eager to attract potential buyers like Henry 
and Claire, used the proceeds from the sale of these bonds to 
support a significant portion of the costs of building Beau 
Chateaux. Everything from the many cobblestone streets, the 
environmentally friendly sanitary sewer system, the water 
distribution network, the parterre and antique rose laden 
community park, and even the expenses associated with the 
neighborhood center with its restaurant, tennis courts, golf 
course, and pool were paid for by the bonds issued by Beau 
Chateaux’s special taxing district.8  
The developer felt quite pleased with his work9 because—
although he did have to personally borrow a decent amount of 
money from his regular lending institution, Realty Bank, in order 
to fund the initial purchase of the land—the vast majority of the 
capital needed to build the improvements and infrastructure for 
Beau Chateaux was provided for by the special district. And 
because it was the special district that issued the bonds and 
guaranteed the debt from the future assessments, he was not 
personally liable for any of these obligations.10 Feeling so 
confident of his success, the developer went ahead and had the 
board of the district issue enough bonds so that he could not only 
complete phase one of Beau Chateaux as planned, but could also 
                                                                                                     
service charges (e.g., bridge tolls, utility fees).” (citations omitted)).  
 8. See generally id. See, e.g., Dale White, Homeowners in Failed Tax 
District Find Themselves in a Bind, HERALD-TRIBUNE (Mar. 8, 2013), 
http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20130308/ARTICLE/130309612 (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2015) (“To pay for [infrastructural improvements], some 
developers obtain the state’s permission to set up CDDs. The special tax 
districts function as a government body that floats bond issues to pay for that 
infrastructure. The district boards add annual assessments to property tax bills 
to pay off the bond issues.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 9. It should be noted that usually developers operate through a business 
entity, such as a limited liability company, partnership, or corporation, and the 
issue typically arises when such an entity constitutes a thinly capitalized firm. 
See William J. Rands, The Closely Held Corporation: Its Capital Structure and 
the Federal Tax Laws, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 1009, 1069–70 (1988) (describing 
situations in which corporations are closely linked to a single developer and 
have little capital). However, for purposes of this Article, I refer to the developer 
in the male gender. 
 10. See White, supra note 8 (“In other words, property owners within a 
community development district assume a debt beside their mortgage and 
property taxes. They are obligated to pay off the district’s bonds.”).  
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go ahead and finish phase two and most of phase three as well, 
all at the same time. People would come far and wide to make a 
home in this idyllic setting. After all, who would not want to live 
in a community where the homes are consistently beautiful, the 
yards immaculate, the streets reminiscent of old Europe, with 
gourmet food trucks lining the pre-fabricated village square, and 
where children are free to play throughout the community under 
the watchful eye of the private neighborhood security service?11 
And to live in this lush fairytale-style paradise, one need only pay 
a little extra on their property tax bill.12 
During the first year, after most of the phase one 
construction at Beau Chateaux was complete, all seemed to go 
well, and new homeowners like Henry and Claire began 
purchasing houses within the development on a fairly routine 
basis, but then the developer started to get a little worried. 
Although a decent number of parcels were now owned by third 
parties like Henry and Claire, a substantial number of the lots 
had yet to be sold and were still owned by the developer. He had 
been able to handle not only payments on the debt service for the 
real estate loan to Realty Bank, but also payment of the many 
individual property tax bills for the unsold parcels only by 
dipping into cash reserves from the project. Surely as word 
spread of the luxuries of Beau Chateaux hordes of willing buyers 
would be forthcoming. But, unfortunately, the housing market 
began to take a serious downturn in 2007 and 2008.13 Home 
                                                                                                     
 11. See generally SAMER BAGAEEN, OLA UDUKU & SASKIA SASSEN, GATED 
COMMUNITIES: SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY IN CONTEMPORARY AND HISTORICAL GATED 
DEVELOPMENTS (2010); SEASIDE INST., VIEWS OF SEASIDE: COMMENTARIES AND 
OBSERVATIONS ON A CITY OF IDEAS (2008); ROBERT A.M. STERN, DAVID FISHMAN & 
JACOB TILOVE, PARADISE PLANNED (2013); DHIRU A. THADANI, VISIONS OF SEASIDE: 
FOUNDATION/EVOLUTION/IMAGINATION BUILT AND UNBUILT ARCHITECTURE (2013). 
 12. See White, supra note 8 (“The district boards add annual assessments 
to property tax bills to pay off the bond issues.”). 
 13. See JAMES R. BARTH, TONG LI, WENLING LE, TRIPHON PHUMIWASANA & 
GLENN YAGO, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE U.S. MORTGAGE AND CREDIT MARKETS: A 
COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET MELTDOWN 50–51 (2009) (illustrating 
the rapid decline in the subprime share of home mortgages); Joseph William 
Singer, Foreclosure and the Failures of Formality, or Subprime Mortgage 
Conundrums and How to Fix Them, 46 CONN. L. REV. 497, 500 (2013) (“Cheered 
on by President George W. Bush’s call for an ‘Ownership Society,’ these 
mortgages helped fuel a housing bubble that burst in 2007, plunging us into the 
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prices began to fall tremendously, and that included those homes 
and parcels within Beau Chateaux.14 The developer started to get 
worried because, although he could decrease the asking price for 
the homes and therefore take a hit to his profits, he could not do 
anything to decrease the annual costs of owning the property due 
to the ad valorem tax bill.15 The following year saw the downfall 
of many financial institutions,16 some of which had been known to 
purchase special district bonds like those of Beau Chateaux, and 
the mortgage market began to collapse as credit dried up.17  
                                                                                                     
worst recession since the Great Depression.” (citing Raymond C. Niles, Eighty 
Years in the Making: How Housing Subsidies Caused the Financial Meltdown, 6 
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 165, 175–76 (2010))).  
 14. See Aline van Duyn, US Housing Market Hit by ‘Walkaways’, FIN. 
TIMES (Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a93abcea-1fe7-11df-8deb-
00144feab49a.html#axzz3VuscmCML (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (“The high 
level of foreclosures in the US—the handing over of homes to banks that lent 
people money to buy them—has been a huge burden on the economy, has kept 
house prices on a downward spiral and has resulted in misery and anxiety for 
millions of people.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Roger 
Lowenstein, Walk Away From Your Mortgage!, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/magazine/10FOB-wwln-t.html (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2015) (“[F]oreclosures depress the neighborhood and drive down 
[house] prices.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 15. See Ad Valorem, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 60 (9th ed. 2009 (“[Latin 
‘according to the value’] (of a tax) proportional to the value of the thing taxed.” 
(brackets in original)). 
 16. See Brooksley Born, Foreword: Deregulation: A Major Cause of the 
Financial Crisis, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 231, 233 (2011) (“These developments 
created the conditions that caused the collapse of the housing bubble to turn 
into a major financial crisis.”); Chad D. Emerson, A Troubled House of Cards: 
Examining How the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 Fails to 
Resolve the Foreclosure Crisis, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 561, 569–70 (2008) (describing 
legislative efforts to save crumbling financial institutions); Singer, supra note 
13, at 521 (illustrating the causes and dangers of insolvent banks); Gregory 
Zuckerman, Susanne Craig & Serena Ng, Goldman Sachs Charged With Fraud, 
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 17, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023 
03491304575187920845670844 (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (explaining the 
involvement of Goldman Sachs in the financial crisis) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 17. See Singer, supra note 13, at 509 (“The entire business model switched 
from long-term repayment of mortgage loans by those who were likely to be able 
to make the payments (with foreclosure available as an unusual and secure 
backup in case of default) to a short-term market dependent on risk borrowers 
and compliant investors.” (citing JAMES R. BARTH ET AL., supra note 13, at 50–51 
(2009))). 
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Residents of Beau Chateaux, like Henry and Claire, began to 
sense that things were not going well. Construction of the 
community center had stopped months ago. The yards and the 
public park were not being kept up with the frequency that they 
once were and social events had vanished entirely. Not only that, 
but twice in the past year they had seen an increase in their 
special assessments. At first they assumed the Beau Chateaux 
special district board wanted to build up reserves or might have 
needed a bit more to finance the construction of the golf course 
and center, but they were now beginning to suspect that 
something else might be afoot. What made matters worse was 
that no one was purchasing any more lots or homes within the 
development. Whole portions of the neighborhood assumed a 
zombie-like feel as structures remained empty and yards became 
overgrown.18  
And the residents were right to be worried. The developer 
had used up all of his reserves and could not make the next 
payment of special assessments on the many unsold parcels in 
the community that he still owned. Soon, Henry, Claire, and their 
neighbors were given notice that the developer had declared 
bankruptcy and that Realty Bank was proceeding to foreclose on 
the many portions of the development still subject to its original 
mortgage. A month later, with no one paying the special 
assessments on that year’s property tax bills, the district as a 
whole went into default on its bonds. The bondholders, not willing 
to sit by and allow Realty Bank to exercise its mortgage rights to 
the prejudice of theirs, also foreclosed on their security rights. As 
                                                                                                     
 18. See Les Christie, Zombie Foreclosures Still Weighing on Housing 
Markets, CNNMONEY.COM (Mar. 13, 2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/13/ 
real_estate/zombie-foreclosures/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (“RealTrac reported 
Thursday that foreclosure filings fell 27% year-over-year in February to a new 
seven-year low, indicating that the pace of filings have returned to normal levels 
since the foreclosure crisis. However, lingering problems loom.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Navideh Forghani, Vacant Homes 
Hurting Neighborhoods, ABC15 ARIZ. (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.abc15.com/ 
news/region-phoenix-metro/central-phoenix/vacant-homes-hurting-neighborhoods 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (“Some investment homes aren’t re-sold right away 
so they can sit vacant for long stretches of time, sometimes becoming 
neighborhood eye-sores. Investors are buying up homes and just letting them sit 
there. Some aren’t maintaining the properties at all.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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part of the special district legal structure, the nonpayment of 
special assessments charged against the parcels within the 
development—much like with traditional real property taxes—
created a lien on the individual lots. These, in turn, could be 
foreclosed upon like any other security device.19 And, also like 
real property taxes, this lien—although the product of an entirely 
private enterprise, used entirely for profit, and the financing of 
which was controlled entirely by the developer—is accorded 
superpriority over and above any pre-existing security rights.20 
This means that although Realty Bank has a first lien in the form 
of its mortgage on the development due to having advanced the 
upfront capital to purchase the land, the lien of the special taxing 
district is given superior status and, when foreclosed, would wipe 
out and completely destroy the lien of the bank.21 
As the bondholders and the bank each commenced 
foreclosure proceedings and fought out their various rights in 
court, Henry, Claire, and their neighbors began to realize the 
severity of their situations. The conditions in Beau Chateaux 
continued to deteriorate. The streets and sidewalks, as well as 
the community park, became overgrown with weeds and littered 
with debris. The community center, only half constructed, began 
to crumble and pose a safety hazard. The golf course became 
overrun with vermin and wild animals. And the many empty 
homes were constantly subjected to vandalism, consistent with 
the slew of recent reports of criminal activity throughout the 
neighborhood. Moreover, this malaise spread to adjoining 
                                                                                                     
 19. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 33:9039.29(A) (2014) (“These benefit special 
assessments shall be a lien on the property against which assessed until paid 
and shall be enforceable in like manner as parish taxes.”); see also Miller, infra 
note 119, at 147–49 (discussing public facilities districts in California); Galvan, 
infra note 114, at 3049–57 (discussing MUDs in Texas); Griffith, infra note 31, 
at 963–68 (discussing Florida’s community development districts, Georgia’s 
infrastructure development districts, Colorado’s public improvement districts, 
Delaware’s special development districts, and New Mexico’s public improvement 
districts). 
 20. See generally supra note 19 and accompanying text.  
 21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) § 4.9(b) (1997) (“A 
holder of a junior interest who purchases real estate at the foreclosure sale of 
any senior lien on that real estate acquires title free and clear of the interest of 
the holder of the equity of redemption and of any interest that was junior to the 
foreclosed lien.”). 
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neighborhoods that, although not benefiting from a special taxing 
district themselves, started to feel the negative effects of the 
nearby failing Beau Chateaux development. Buyers, retailers, 
and developers began to bolt from the area as properties become 
undesirable, values fell, and the community acquired the 
reputation of being one in decline.  
Newspapers began to report that other real-estate-related 
special taxing districts like Beau Chateaux in the surrounding 
counties and across the state—as well as in other states—were 
similarly failing in massive numbers as billions of dollars of 
bonded indebtedness defaulted or were close to default.22 Cities 
and towns across the United States that used special taxing 
districts for more altruistic purposes—such as to incentivize 
development in depressed areas or to provide critical human 
services to areas that are economically disadvantaged—were 
advised by their legal counsel that federal housing regulators 
have stated that because of the super liens that these districts 
can produce, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will not support 
residential lending for properties that are located within or may 
be located within such districts.23 Without the ability to obtain 
conventional financing, many community and economic 
development groups have been forced to abandon the use of 
special taxing districts as a way to finance critical infrastructure 
                                                                                                     
 22. See, e.g., White supra note 8 (describing the failure of special districts 
caused by the mortgage crisis); see also Gary Fineout, Florida Communities Pay 
Attention to a Tax Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2009), http://www.ny 
times.com/2009/07/10/us/10florida.html?_r=0&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1422115201-
fB+y9qlj+rQuj3h5IS/mJQ (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (describing the impact of 
tax disputes on Florida special districts) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); Lauren Ritchie, Community Development Districts in Lake and 
Across Florida in Financial Crisis, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Aug. 22, 2010), 
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2010-08-22/news/os-lk-lauren-ritchie-bond-
defaults-0820100822_1_community-development-districts-bond-issue-richard-
lehmann (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (arguing that community development 
districts unfairly saddle homeowners with massive debt) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 23. See, e.g., Prentiss Cox, Keeping PACE?: The Case Against Property 
Assessed Clean Energy Financing Programs, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 83, 103 (2011) 
(“On August 31, 2010, the GSEs issued guidance statements indicating that 
they would not purchase mortgage loans if the homeowner had a PACE 
obligation unless the PACE program was structured so that the PACE lien was 
subordinate to the first lien mortgage loan.”). 
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in areas where conventional lending is too risky to attract lenders 
at reasonable rates, if at all.24 
Henry and Claire now desire more than anything to sell their 
home and get as far away as possible from Beau Chateaux. 
Unfortunately, they cannot afford to purchase a new home until 
this one has sold but, due to the neighborhood’s decline and the 
extremely high property tax bill, they cannot find a willing buyer. 
Also, because they purchased their home at the height of the 
housing bubble, they cannot afford to take a hit on the sale and 
thus cannot go down on their price. With so many of the parcels 
within the development being unmarketable, Beau Chateaux 
becomes a haven for blight and joins the line to the guillotine 
with the many other failed developments that have resulted from 
the unregulated abuse of real-estate-related development special 
taxing districts.25 
While constructed above in the form of a narrative 
hypothetical, the plight of Henry, Claire, and the residents of 
Beau Chateaux is all too real. Stories like these have become 
common across the United States, especially in places where the 
ills from the housing bubble’s burst were felt most severely, like 
in Florida.26 Special taxing districts, for so long tied to traditional 
governmental functions like providing fire and police safety, 
water distribution, sewer services, and the development of 
economically distressed areas or important commercial centers, 
have become the instrumentalities of private real estate 
developers—and with tragic results.27 As cities and municipalities 
                                                                                                     
 24. For a discussion of the demise of another type of special taxing district, 
the Property Assessment Clean Energy special district, see Michael A. Wrapp, 
Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE): Victim of Loan Giants or Way of the 
Future?, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 273, 284 (2013) (“The depth of 
the controversy over PACE programs became fully apparent when, with the 
supervision of the FHFA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac flatly refused to 
purchase any mortgages burdened by a PACE lien.”). 
 25. See Ritchie, supra note 22 (illustrating the impact of the mortgage 
crisis on Florida communities utilizing special districts); White, supra note 8 
(same); see generally Finout, supra note 22 (same). 
 26. See sources cited supra note 25 (describing the severity of the economic 
fallout in Florida).  
 27.  See DAVID L. CALLIES, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PUBLIC PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS IN THE AGE OF ECONOMIC DISTRESS: TAX INCREMENT FINANCING, 
SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS AND REDEVELOPMENT 19 (2012), http://files.ali-
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across the United States became zealous in their desire to attract 
new residents and to land economic development projects, they 
became more willing—or dare say, enthusiastic—to bestow their 
guarded public powers and prerogatives into the hands of private 
developers to aid them in obtaining easy, fast cash.28 
Unfortunately, with such power and such self-interest in the 
unchecked hands of private individuals, many developers 
overextended themselves (or rather their districts), which, 
coupled with the housing crisis, caused the entire real estate 
special taxing district scheme to come crashing down.29  
But this failure has not only meant that people like Henry 
and Claire find themselves in a hard spot. The ripple effect on the 
surrounding community—which can sometimes constitute an 
entire municipality or county—can be substantial.30 Economic 
depression begets more economic depression as potential 
investors, residents, and businesses retreat or run from these 
deteriorating areas, leaving them to become ghost towns filled 
with struggling businesses and haunted neighborhoods where 
                                                                                                     
cle.org/thumbs/datastorage/skoobesruoc/pdf/TSUF02_chapter_02_thumb.pdf 
(“The quintessential TIF [tax-increment financing] project, however, is a public 
infrastructure project that encourages private investment . . . that would 
otherwise be the cost of the private developer.”); see also FELDMAN, ROLAPP & 
ASSOCS., ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF COMMUNITY FACILITIES DISTRICTS 
FOR ISSUER, DEVELOPER, AND ULTIMATE PROPERTY OWNER 1–2, 
http://www.fieldman.com/PDFs/Advantages-Disadvantages%20of%20CFDs.pdf 
[hereinafter FELDMAN ROLAPP] (listing the advantages and disadvantages of 
special districts to issuers and developers). 
 28. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 220 (describing the need for municipalities 
to compete with each other and provide incentives for development). 
 29. See White, supra note 8 (“As happened with Gran Paradiso, 
developments were started in what was becoming a declining housing market 
and the buyers needed to pay off CDD debt did not materialize, Lehmann 
said.”); Ritchie supra note 22 (“Today, Florida has 294 of these powerful districts 
that have borrowed billions by issuing bonds, and 123 of those—42 percent—are 
either defaulting or aren’t collecting enough money to make their 
payments . . . .”); FELDMAN ROLAPP, supra note 27, at 1 (listing risk of bond 
default through no fault of the issuer as a disadvantage of community facilities 
districts). 
 30. See generally Collin Gordon, Blight the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic 
Development, and the Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305 
(2004). 
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many homes sit vacant or abandoned by their underwater 
owners.31  
Further, this process undermines the basic notions of vested 
property rights without implicating constitutional considerations. 
The lender whose loan enables the developer to buy the land 
traditionally receives a first priority mortgage on the property.32 
                                                                                                     
 31. See Janice C. Griffith, Special Tax Districts to Finance Residential 
Infrastructure, 39 URB. LAW. 959, 979 (2007) (“Even though the enabling IDD 
statutes in Florida and Georgia provide that the debt of an IDD does not 
constitute an obligation of the state  . . . . [t]he municipal bond market and 
credit rating agencies’ practices may link the district’s creditworthiness to the 
locality and possibly the state.”); Paul Donsky, Volume of ‘Subdivision’ Vacant 
Lots Overwhelms Banks, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Aug. 17, 2009), http: 
//m.ajc.com/news/business/volume-of-subdivision-vacant-lots-overwhelms-banks/ 
nQKdL/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (“These idled, ‘zombie’ subdivisions can be 
found across metro Atlanta, but they’re most prevalent in outer-ring suburban 
areas. Selling them has proven tough, with some properties sitting on the 
market for months on end without even a nibble.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Becky Johnson, Development Done Right: Failed Projects 
Open Door for Those Taking the Long View, SMOKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (June 11, 
2014), http://www.smokymountainnews.com/component/k2/item/13096-develop 
ment-done-right-failed-projects-open-door-for-those-taking-the-long-view (last 
visited Mar. 30 2015) (“With the development in foreclosure, lot owners were in 
limbo and afraid to build homes. The roads were deteriorating, and any hope of 
a quick rebound in the real estate market had been dashed.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Becky Johnson, Picking Up the Pieces Proves 
Costly, Time-Consuming for Local Governments, SMOKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (June 
3, 2014), http://www.smokymountainnews.com/component/k2/item/13005-
picking-up-the-pieces-proves-costly-timeconsuming-for-local-governments (last 
visited Mar. 30 2015) (“Developers took down their shingles, folded up their 
tents and walked away, many of them bankrupt and forclosed on, with no 
means to polish off the vast network of dirt roads, culverts and cleared land 
they’s engraved on the mountains during the short-lived heyday.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); JC Reindl, Oakland County Wants Action 
at Site of Gigantic Failed $2-Billion Development ‘Eyesore’, DETROIT FREE PRESS 
(Mar. 10, 2013), http://archive.freep.com/article/20130310/BUSINESS06 
/3031100218/Oakland-County-wants0action-at-site-of-gigantic-failed-2-billion-
development-eyesore (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (“Conceived as a 42-billion 
sprawling and upscale town center for Oakland County, Bloomfield Park today 
is a collection of half-constructed buildings, dirt roads and unused parking 
garages that stand as ruins of the Great Recession and the overly exuberant 
real estate investment decisions that preceded it.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 32. See STUART M. SAFT, COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 9:19 (3d 
ed. 2013) (“The mortgage will also indicate that the indebtedness is secured by 
any buildings and improvements now or hereafter constructed on the 
land . . . .”).  
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Except in rare cases, the lender would refuse to make that loan 
without a first priority lien,33 which ensures that the debt will be 
paid before others whose liens or other interests in the property 
arose after the first mortgage loan was made.34 However, the law 
gives the special taxing district lien, imbued with public power 
but used for purely private purposes, superpriority.35 Even 
though the developer’s nonpayment of the assessments occurs 
only after the bank first obtains its mortgage, the mortgage is 
nonetheless inferior to the lien.36 While this type of subordination 
has merit in the context of general property taxes imposed by a 
municipality for purposes of education, police protection, and 
other public services, it represents an extreme injustice in the 
context of purely private, profit-driven developments.37 Despite 
this, there is no requirement that the special district or the 
municipality that created it pay just compensation to the first 
secured party for the impairment to its rights in the property.38 
                                                                                                     
 33. See id. (explaining that mortgages usually contain affirmations that the 
property is free from other liens except those elaborated in a schedule annexed 
to the mortgage). 
 34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) § 7.1 (1997) (“A 
valid foreclosure of a mortgage terminates all interests in the foreclosed real 
estate that are junior to the mortgage being foreclosed and whose holders are 
properly joined or notified under applicable law.”). 
 35. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 33:9039.29(A) (2014) (“These benefit special 
assessments shall be a lien on the property against which assessed until paid 
and shall not be enforceable in like manner as parish taxes.”); see also Griffith 
supra note 31, at 969 (“The district board determines the amount of 
assessments, which constitute a lien against the property until paid.”). 
 36. See Griffith, supra note 31, at 969 (“The district board determines the 
amount of the assessments, which constitute a lien against the property until 
paid.”). 
 37. See 4 JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 23:11 (2014) (“Absent 
a state constitutional provision to the contrary, the state legislature has great 
leeway in fashioning classifications between and among various types of 
property for revenue raising purposes provided that it has not acted in a 
palpably arbitrary or invidiously discriminatory fashion.”). 
 38. Id. § 21:17 (citing Buettner v. City of St. Cloud, 277 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 
1979)). Here you should say whether the mortgage lender knows, when making 
the loan, that the collateral is part of a special taxing district. If the lender 
knows that the loan is being made on collateral that is within or may be within 
a special taxing district, then the lender can take into account the risk of 
subordination with its eyes open and can build that risk into the interest rate it 
charges.  
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And lastly, the use of special taxing districts for private real 
estate developments has a wider adverse effect on community 
lending as a whole. Because real estate lenders cannot rely, as 
they have traditionally in the past, upon a first lien mortgage, 
many will no longer make loans for projects in areas that are 
subject to special taxing districts, no matter what legitimate and 
larger societal good they serve.39 Further, because of the potential 
to be primed by the district’s super lien, financial institutions at 
the secondary mortgage market level—who play such a critical 
role in making a liquid residential mortgage market possible—
will likely refuse to purchase mortgages that are secured by 
properties within special districts, something that has already 
occurred in recent, similar situations involving PACE financing.40 
While this has the potential to kill off effectively the use of purely 
private real estate development special districts, it will have the 
unintended consequence of eliminating the use of these financing 
tools in scenarios where they are truly warranted, such as in 
projects that improve poor neighborhoods or economically 
depressed areas where no conventional lender will extend 
credit.41 By doing so, a whole sector of viable community 
development financing will be utterly abolished.42 Although 
special taxing districts have received significant consideration by 
legal scholars in the past, this Article helps draw a more focused 
                                                                                                     
 39. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Wilson, Maura A. Marcheski & Elias B. Hinckley, 
The Great PACE Controversy, 25 PROB. & PROP. 38, 39 (2011) (“Mortgage 
underwriters feared that loans secured by mortgages would become subordinate 
to PACE liens and as a result would not be readily sellable on the secondary 
mortgage market.”); see also Jeffrey Hoops, Setting the PACE for Energy 
Efficiency: The Rise, Fall, and (Potential) Return of Property Assessed Clean 
Energy, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 901, 902 (2012) (“Specifically, the FHFA believes 
that PACE creates unacceptable risk for lenders in general and its regulated 
entities in particular because most PACE legislation gives PACE assessment 
liens priority over pre-existing mortgages in the event of homeowner default.”). 
 40. See Ian M. Larson, Keeping PACE: Federal Mortgage Lenders Halt 
Local Clean Energy Programs, 76 MO. L. REV. 599, 600 (2011) (describing the 
refusal of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase mortgages encumbered by 
PACE liens). 
 41. See id. at 601 (“Missouri lenders, legislatures, homeowners, 
environmentalists, and small businesses have thus been unable to move forward 
with a PACE program since federal lenders halted the initiative nationwide.”). 
 42. See supra note 40.  
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attention to the blatant abuses and negative effects caused by the 
use of special taxing districts in the purely private real-estate-
development setting. Part II discusses the current economic 
climate of cities and municipalities across the country—those 
entities that serve as the primary creator of special taxing 
districts—in the wake of the Great Recession. This includes 
exploring the effects that the financial crash had on their well 
being as well as the continued economic and financial pressures 
faced by municipalities.43 Part II also highlights the 
reinvigoration in recent years of the importance of local 
government as a problem solver and a driver of economic and 
social prosperity—popularly called the “resilient city” 
movement.44 Part III gives an overview of the history and uses of 
special taxing districts throughout American history, including a 
discussion of the development of special taxing districts used for 
real estate development purposes.45 It also includes a discussion 
of how, in light of the increasing intensity of economic 
development competition between cities, these particular special 
taxing districts have become tools that local government leaders 
use to lure private investors and businesses to their locale.46 Part 
IV peels away the gilt and hype behind these special districts 
when used for purely private development by pointing out their 
negative effects on vested property rights, the larger surrounding 
community, and the wider real estate financing market, 
particularly with respect to community lending.47 After analyzing 
these adverse consequences, Part V investigates the ways in 
which the use of real estate special taxing districts can be better 
regulated and curtailed by pointing out the drawbacks to seeking 
a private, contract-based remedy as well by trying to prescribe 
statutorily their usage.48 This Article concludes by advocating 
that an equitable jurisprudential approach—in the form of a two-
                                                                                                     
 43. Infra Part I. 
 44. See generally infra Part II. 
 45. See generally infra Part III. 
 46. See generally infra Part III. 
 47. See generally infra Part IV. 
 48. See generally infra Part V. 
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pronged test—be adopted by courts to help better police the 
legitimate use of special taxing districts.49 
II. Special Taxing Districts and the Reinvigoration of Localism 
Over the past several years, cities and other municipalities 
have been tested and strained by changing political winds and 
powerful economic and financial pressures.50 The financial and 
housing crisis of 2007 and 2008, followed by the Great Recession, 
caused a tremendous mistrust in the federal government.51 Many 
viewed poor policymaking and a loose regulatory system, all 
dominated and controlled at the federal level, as having been 
significantly, if not chiefly, responsible for allowing greed, 
corruption, and vice to settle into the American economy and 
which ultimately brought it crashing down.52  
                                                                                                     
 49. See generally infra Part VI. 
 50. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 227 (“While cities have enjoyed a 
prominent place in the story of flourishing throughout history, these institutions 
have also faced their share of trials and tribulations.” (citing JAMES HOWARD 
KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICA’S 
MAN-MADE LANDSCAPE 9–15 (1993))).  
 51. See id. at 227–28 (explaining the “trials and tribulations” of cities 
during the Great Recession).  
 52. See Singer, supra note 13, at 500–01 (arguing that deregulation 
contributed significantly to the recession); David Leonhardt, Washington’s 
Invisible Hand, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/ 
09/28/magazine/28wwln-reconsider.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (“The 
current financial crisis is frequently called the worst since the Great Depression. 
And [financial regulation legislation in the 1990s] is often cited as a cause, even 
by some of its onetime supporters.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Glenn Kessler, Obama’s Claim that the Bush Tax Cuts Led to the 
Economic Crisis, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/blogs/fact-checker/post/obamas-claim-that-the-bush-tax-cuts-led-to-the-eco 
nomic-crisis/2012/09/30/06e8f578-0a6e-11e2-afff-d6c7f20a83bf_blog.html (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2015) (analyzing the impact of the Bush tax cuts on the Great 
Recession) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Stan Liebowitz, 
The Real Scandal: How Feds Invited the Mortgage Mess, N.Y. POST (Feb. 5, 
2008), http://nypost.com/2008/02/05/the-real-scandal/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) 
(“From the current hand-wringing, you’d think that the banks came up with the 
idea of looser underwriting standards on their own, with regulators just asleep 
on the job. In fact, it was the regulators who relaxed these standards—at the 
behest of community groups and ‘progressive’ political forces.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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In the wake of these events, political tolerance for centralized 
decision-making—and spending—has declined significantly.53 In its 
place has been a rise of an intense focus on cities and local 
governments.54 But municipalities have, in many ways, a heavier 
yoke to carry in the wake of the financial downturn and, amid these 
increasing demands to be society’s new problem solvers, local 
governments are faced with intense pressures from all sides.55 It is 
through these economic and social pressures that local government 
decision-making has been steered precariously toward the creation of 
more and more special taxing districts as an instrument for 
                                                                                                     
 53. See Eric Liu, Bypass Washington, Save America, CNN (Sept. 26, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/26/opinion/liu-government-shutdown/ (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2015) (arguing that local governments have adapted local policy 
solutions in the face of federal inefficiency) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); Joy Wilke, Americans’ Belief That Gov’t Is Too Powerful at Record 
Level (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/164591/americans-belief-gov-
powerful-record-level.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (“[60% of Americans] 
believe the federal government has too much power . . . . At least half of 
Americans since 2005 have said the government has too much power. Thirty-
two percent now say the government has the right amount of power. Few say it 
has too little power.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 43% 
Say Local Government Better Than Feds, States, RASMUSSEN REP. (Feb. 16, 
2010), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics
/february_2010/43_say_local_government_better_than_feds+states (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2015) (“Forty-three percent (43%) of U.S. voters rate the performance 
of their local government as tops compared to its counterparts on the state and 
federal level.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 54. See John Parisella, The Rising Importance of Major Cities, AMERICAS 
QUARTERLY (Oct. 6, 2010) http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/1859 (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2015) (“Like it or not, cities and their first administrators are 
being called upon to play a greater role on issues affecting more than their 
actual jurisdictions and this is a welcomed development.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Sam Casella, Let Cities Be Cities, 
PLANETIZEN (Nov. 26, 2001, 12:00 AM), http://www.planetizen.com/node/34 (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2015) (“History teaches us that cities are crucial to 
civilization.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); David 
Lowenthal, Visible Cities, HARV. DESIGN MAG. 78 (Winter/Spring 2001), 
http://www.harvarddesignmagazine.org/issues/13/visible-cities (last visited Mar. 
30, 2015) (arguing that the Great Recession has provided challenges and 
opportunities for cities to implement local policy solutions) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 55. See Parisella, supra note 54 (“Like it or not, cities and their first 
administrators are being called upon to play a greater role on issues affecting 
more than their actual jurisdiction and this is a welcome development.”).  
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economic, financial, and cultural viability, which has, in turn, 
served as an invitation for abuse and poor policymaking.56 
A. The Effects of the Economic Crisis on Local Governments 
In order to understand why special taxing districts have 
been, and will likely only continue to be, such an attractive tool 
for use by local governments in fulfilling their new post-Recession 
destiny, it is necessary to appreciate how the economic crisis has 
affected municipalities across the country.57  
Cities have enjoyed a prominent role in human society 
throughout the ages.58 The American city is no different, and, in 
fact, many of the greatest moments in the history of the United 
States—the rise and fall of great political movements, the birth of 
the industrial age, the genesis of new technologies, and the rise of 
a higher quality of life—took place amid the hustle and bustle of 
her cities.59 
                                                                                                     
 56. See id. (“It is becoming increasingly obvious that large cities are centers 
of economic, political, cultural, and community life. Together, they are doing 
more to increase their efforts to share best practices on safety, environmental, 
educational and community integration issues.”); Odinet, supra note 5, at 219 
(“General governmental power and authority has shifted between a model 
favoring a more centralized federal or state government and a structure focused 
more on the autonomy and control of local governments.”). 
 57. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE LOCAL SQUEEZE: FALLING REVENUES 
AND GROWING DEMAND FOR SERVICES CHALLENGE CITIES, COUNTIES, AND 
SCHOOL DISTRICTS 1 (June 2012) http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploaded 
Files/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/American_Cities/Pew_Cities_Local_Squeeze.pdf 
[hereinafter LOCAL SQUEEZE] (describing the concurrence of a decline in state aid 
and property taxes with the rise of demand for government services). 
 58. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 4, § 1:4 (“Historically, urban life has 
afforded almost unlimited opportunities to attain the highest living and 
intellectual standards.”); Odinet, supra note 5, at 218 (“Few societal institutions 
have been as integral to the growth and prosperity of human civilizations as the 
city.”). See generally ALAN EHRENHALT, THE GREAT INVERSION AND THE FUTURE OF 
THE AMERICAN CITY (2013); T.R. GLOVER, THE ANCIENT WORLD: A BEGINNING 
(1937); MASON HAMMOND, THE CITY IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 33 (1972). 
 59. See generally JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN 
CITIES (1961); RICHARD LAWTON, THE RISE AND FALL OF GREAT CITIES: ASPECTS OF 
URBANIZATION IN THE WESTERN WORLD (1989); DONALD L. MILLER, CITY OF THE 
CENTURY: THE EPIC OF CHICAGO AND THE MAKING OF AMERICA (1996). 
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1. The Financial Faring of Cities in the Great Recession 
Although cities have faced a bevy of different challenges over 
the years—everything from the era of decay after the decline of 
the industrial era to the attempted renaissance brought about by 
the Housing Act of 195460 and other federal legislation—the most 
recent wave of challenges came from the crash of the financial 
markets and the effects of the Great Recession.61 Specifically, the 
recession brought about a sharp decline in local government tax 
revenues,62 as massive streams of tax revenue that cities had 
come to expect suddenly dried up or became consumed by new 
and unforeseen financial obligations.63 City services ranging far 
across the spectrum were privatized in an effort to shift financial 
responsibility and accompanying costs.64 Such services included 
things as varied as outsourcing the operation of the city zoo, trash 
pick-up, and even 911 emergency call centers.65 Budget cuts 
brought about massive layoffs of local government employees 
                                                                                                     
 60. Housing Act of 1954, 83 Pub. L. No. 560, 68 Stat. 590. 
 61. See generally PETER HALL, CITIES OF TOMORROW: AN INTELLECTUAL 
HISTORY OF URBAN PLANNING AND DESIGN IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 13–46 
(1988). See Odinet, supra note 5, at 219 (“Similarly, the city . . . has often been 
subjected to the ever-changing economic winds which, when combined with poor 
local government decision making, can crush a municipality under the weight of 
reduced revenue streams and burdensome financial obligations.” (citing Howard 
Chernick, Adam Langley & Andrew Reschovsky, The Impact of the Great 
Recession and the Housing Crisis on the Financing of America’s Largest Cities 1–
3 (Univ. of Wis.-Madison, Working Paper Series No. 2011-008, 2011))); Michael 
W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual 
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425 (1993). 
 62. See LOCAL SQUEEZE, supra note 57 (analyzing decreased local 
government revenue streams by using states like Michigan and Ohio as case 
studies). 
 63. See id. (“Many [states, cities, and counties are] in a fiscal vise, squeezed 
on one side by reduced state aid and property tax income—which together make 
up more than half of local revenues—and growing demand for services on the 
other.”). 
 64. See id. (explaining that some states, like New Jersey, have proposed 
privatization as a solution to revenue problems). 
 65.  See id. (“Others have restructured departments or consolidated 
services with other localities. The city of Olathe, Kansas, recently partnered 
with surrounding Johnson County to build and run a single 911 dispatch 
facility, saving the city more than $300,000 in annual staffing and equipment 
costs.”). 
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such as teachers, policemen, and firefighters, all in an effort to 
stabilize city finances.66  
The reason behind these drastic measures stemmed from 
diminishing tax revenues.67 By one report, states were hit with a 
13% decline in local government revenues at the end of 2009.68 In 
the past when cities had been faced by low tax revenues, they 
were able to obtain third-party funding from state and federal 
coffers,69 but the Great Recession brought this back-stop system 
to a halt as both the state and the federal government were hit 
with their own financial woes.70 State legislatures could barely 
                                                                                                     
 66. See id. (citing Lisa Allmendinger, Saline School Board Approves 
‘Structurally Deficient’ $51.5 Million Operating Budget for 2011–2012, ANN 
ARBOR NEWS (June 29, 2011), http://www.annarbor.com/news/saline-school-
board-approves-final-515-million-operating-budget/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)); Tracy Carloss, Cleveland 
Mayor Says All Departments Affected by City Layoffs, NEWSNET5 (May 16, 2011), 
http://www.newsnet5.com/news/local-news/cleveland-metro/cleveland-mayor-
says-all-departments-affected-by-city-layoffs (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) 
(“Through a combination of layoffs, attrition, hiring freezes, and furloughs, local 
governments shed half a million jobs, or 3.4 percent of their overall workforce, 
between September 2008 and December 2011, with half of this loss coming from 
the education sector.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 67. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 228–29 (providing examples of 
municipalities that laid off employees to compensate for decreased revenue). 
 68. See id. at 229–30 (citing Lucy Dadayan, Tax Revenues Surpass Previous 
Peak but Growth Softens Once Again: Local Property Tax Collections Resume 
Modest Gains, 87 ROCKEFELLER INST. 1, 2 (2012), http:// 
www.rockinst.org/pdf/government_finance/state_revenue_report/2012-04-19-
SRR_87.pdf (“For instance, by the end of 2009, the majority of states were 
seeing a 13% decline in local tax revenues from prior years while budget 
shortfalls continued to rise.”). 
 69. See LOCAL SQUEEZE, supra note 57 (“Federal funds that have helped 
localities address these problems in the past also are beginning to shrink or 
expire.”); Tracy Gordon, A Great Recession Brief: State and Local Budgets and 
the Great Recession, BROOKINGS (July 2012), 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/12/state-local-budgets-gordon 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (“State and local revenues often decline in an 
economic downturn, but federal grants may help to offset these losses.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 70. See Wendy Edelberg, Automatic Reductions in Government Spending—
aka Sequestration, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (Feb. 28, 2013), 
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/43961 (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (referencing a 
“fiscal tightening” on the part of the federal government) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Nicholas Johnson, The State and Local Drag 
on the Recovery, HUFFINGTON POST (Jun. 6, 2012), 
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afford to meet their own financial obligations and were similarly 
on a cutting spree to balance their budgets.71 At the federal level, 
public opinion raged against additional borrowing and thereby 
cut off the possibility of a federal bailout for America’s cities.72 
2. Trying to Do More with Less and Less 
Services that had long been seen as essentially tied to the 
function of local government—such as the provision of safety and 
fire services, roads and transportation, libraries, housing, and 
public health73—were all subjected to deep draconian cuts.74 And 
                                                                                                     
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nicholas-johnson/the-state-and-local-drag-on-
the-recovery_b_1581753.html? (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (arguing that layoffs 
by state and local governments slowed recovery from the recession) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Odinet, supra note 5, at 230 (claiming 
that federal funding has waned since the Great Recession). 
 71. See Gordon supra note 30, at 333 (explaining legislators’ intent to 
restrain state tax-increment financing following the Great Recession). 
 72. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 230 (citing Jonathan D. Salant & Kathleen 
Miller, Federal Spending Cuts Slice Contract Awards 11% in 2013, BLOOMBERG 
(Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-16/federal-spending-
cuts-slice-contract-awards-11-in-2013.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review)); Carrie Dann, Congress Passes 
Massive Funding Bill to Keep Government Open (For Now), NBC NEWS (Jan. 16, 
2013), http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/16/22328978-congress-
passes-massive-funding-bill-to-keep-government-open-for-now (last visited Mar. 
30, 2015) (“The emerging political climate that favored reducing deficits and 
cutting spending resulted in less direct aid to local governments from Congress 
and federal departments.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 73. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 226 
[U]rban centers began to expand their offerings to include a wide 
array of amenities and services that had been little known prior to 
this period. “A simple list of urban functions and the date when they 
first began to be performed illustrates [this] problem-solving 
approach[:] . . . provision of a municipal water system (1822); sewage 
and sanitary works (1823); street railways (1832); public education 
(1840); municipal police force (1844); public parks (1840’s); tax-
supported public libraries (1854); bridges financed by municipal funds 
(1863); public health boards (1866); outdoor lighting (1880’s).” 
(citation omitted). 
 74. See LOCAL SQUEEZE, supra note 57 (“[Cleveland, following budget 
shortfalls,] also shut down five fire companies. With six trash crews eliminated, 
residents waited longer to have their refuse and recycling collected.”); Rob 
Gurwitt, As States Cut Aid, Localities Learn to Do Less with Less, PEW 
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even as the economy began to emerge from the downturn and 
private enterprise began to feel optimistic, dark storm clouds 
remained over local governments.75 Rainy day funds had long 
since been raided to maintain essential city services, and there 
were no more disposable public assets to sell in order to plug 
holes with one-time monies.76 Sales-tax revenues remained low, 
and the housing crisis’s impact on property taxes produced a 
lagging effect such that, although the crash occurred in 2007–
2008, the impact of the reduced tax monies only truly began to be 
seen in 2010.77 And lastly, many new financial obligations are on 
the horizon, such as debt service due on public-works bonds and 
retirement-system debt.78 
Against this backdrop of financial austerity, little outside 
support, and increasing expectations, cities have become 
ravenous for new forms of tax revenues.79 Almost all policy 
debates within the hallowed halls of city government across the 
country are consumed with ways in which new jobs, new 
developments, and new sources of tax monies can be lured, 
enticed, maintained, and augmented within the particular 
jurisdiction.80 
                                                                                                     
CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2011/10/03/as-states-cut-aid-localities-learn-to-do-less-
with-less (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (“[In Michigan], cities have cut back on 
services, laid off workers, put off hiring, merged departments and positions, and 
renegotiated labor contracts.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 75. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 243 (“As cities emerge from the wake of the 
economic downturn, the landscape has been altered and cities are being forced 
to adapt and re-tool so as to meet this new world order.”). 
 76. See id. at 229 (referencing the use of “rainy day funds” to deal with 
economic emergencies).  
 77. See id. at 231 (“Although cities vary in their dependence upon sales 
taxes, these revenue sources declined early in the economic crisis and have 
continued to remain relatively low.”).  
 78. See LOCAL SQUEEZE, supra note 57 (listing “exacerbating pension and 
debt woes” under “long term obligations” of states and municipalities). 
 79. See id. (“Localities’ dependence on two faltering sources of revenue—
property taxes and state aid—presents profound challenges.”) 
 80. See id. (discussing, at length, the efforts of various local governments to 
reduce spending and increase revenue in innovative ways); Odinet, supra note 5, 
at 236 (describing the attempts by local governments to entice private 
developers to remain through investment). 
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B. A Call for Resilience in the Age of Cities 
As the country enters—or perhaps better stated, reenters—the 
Age of Cities, the economic and financial pressures facing America’s 
local government decision makers are extreme, and so are the 
expectations.81 As the public has come to view federal leaders (and 
in some sense, state leaders as well) as having failed to move the 
country forward and bring about a robust economic recovery,82 all 
eyes have now turned to cities.83  
                                                                                                     
 81. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 231–32 (describing the “particularly intense” 
economic pressures as a result of factors like pensions and retiring employees); see 
also Melissa M. Berry, Thinking Like A City: Grounding Social-Ecological Resilience 
in an Urban Land Ethic, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 117, 118 (2014) (arguing that the gradual 
shift from rural to urban life has frustrated Americans’ attempts to understand 
their place in the natural world); Jeffrey B. Litwak, State Border Towns and 
Resiliency: Barriers to Interstate Intergovernmental Cooperation, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 
193, 194–95 (2014) (linking small towns’ difficulties in providing infrastructure with 
a lack of urban resiliency to crises); John Travis Marshall & Ryan Max Rowberry, 
Urban Wreckage and Resiliency: Articulating a Practical Framework for Preserving, 
Reconstructing, and Building Cities, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 49, 51 (2014) (“Governments 
at all levels now face the daunting challenges of rebuilding cities quickly and 
ensuring they are stronger than before the disaster event.”); Andrea McArdle, Storm 
Surges, Disaster Planning, and Vulnerable Populations at the Urban Periphery: 
Imagining A Resilient New York After Superstorm Sandy, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 19, 19–
20 (2014) (illustrating the need for local policy solutions in order to mitigate the 
extreme damage of disastrous weather); Palma Joy Strand, Cultivating “Civity”: 
Enhancing City Resilience with Bridging Relationships and Increased Trust, 50 
IDAHO L. REV. 153, 154 (2014) (describing the need to mitigate “the devastating 
effects on large numbers of people when cities experience environmental and/or 
social shocks”); Kellen Zale, Urban Resiliency and the Right to Destroy, 50 IDAHO L. 
REV. 85, 85 (2014) (“When considering what makes a city resilient, planners, policy-
makers and academics often focus on creating infrastructure to with-stand, respond, 
and adapt to change, whether environmental, economic or demographic . . . .”). 
 82. See Pan Pylas, Distrust in Government Growing, Survey Finds, USATODAY 
(Jan. 20, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/ 01/20/distrust-in-
government-growing/4655111/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (“Trust in elected leaders 
has fallen sharply, a global survey revealed Monday, citing the protracted budget 
battle in Washington that nearly saw the U.S. default on its debts and Europe’s 
stuttering response to its debt crisis as key reasons for the drop.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Americans Distrust Government, but Want It to 
Do More, NPRNEWS, http://www.npr.org/ programs/specials/poll/govt/summary.html 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (“The survey found that nearly a quarter of American 
adults believe that the federal government is a major threat to their personal rights 
and freedoms, and nearly half think it is at least some threat.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 83. See Tony Arnold, Resilient Cities and Adaptive Law, 50 IDAHO. L. REV. 245, 
 
SUPER-LIENS TO THE RESCUE? 731 
Public policy decision makers, the media spotlight, scholars, 
and policy advocates have all focused intensely on local 
governments and their budding role.84 By virtue of their size and 
governance structure, many laud cities as being nimble and deft 
so as to have the ability to quickly respond to changing market 
conditions and as being flexible and adaptable so as to be 
innovative in taking advantage of new opportunities.85 Further, 
cities are praised as having “boots on the ground” in terms of 
understanding how everyday citizens deal with the challenges of 
this new economic climate.86 Because the services provided by 
cities—everything from trash pickup, to making sure there is 
running water,87 to keeping schools open for children—are so 
intimately tied to the everyday experiences of society, cities are 
viewed as having the unique ability to touch people’s lives 
directly—unlike the more removed and distant state and federal 
governments.88 
Local governments also, in theory, react more quickly to the 
will of their citizens.89 In other words, because elected officials 
                                                                                                     
247 (2014) (“The term ‘resilient cities’ has grown in popularity, and many cities seek 
to become or remain resilient.”); Odinet, supra note 5, at 220 (referencing a 
reinvigorated interest in the power of city governments in recent years). 
 84. See Lowenthal, supra note 54 (analyzing the image and perceptions of 
cities throughout history); Parisella, supra note 54 (arguing that the power of 
city government is growing as evidenced by the ability of mayors to influence 
national debates on issues like national security). 
 85. See Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban 
Governance, 82 MINN. L. REV. 503, 503–04 (1997) (“A metropolitan area, thus, 
functions as a kind of ‘marketplace’ in which, due to interlocal mobility, 
residents are more likely to have their preferences satisfied by local government 
offerings than if comparable public goods and services were offered by higher 
levels of government.”). 
 86. See JAMES WILFORD GARNER, GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 
NATIONAL, STATE AND LOCAL 5–56 (2011) (describing the form and function of 
local governments and the benefits of these attributes). 
 87. See Briffault, supra note 85, at 503–04 (listing the types of services 
provided by cities). 
 88. See id. (describing how local governments will be able to provide more 
efficient services than those “offered by higher levels of government” (citing 
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 
(1956))). 
 89. See id. (explaining how “interlocal mobility” can lead to residents 
having their preferences satisfied quickly). 
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and decision makers live so close and interact so regularly with 
their constituents, there is more of a direct democratic aspect to 
the way in which municipalities are governed.90 And, moreover, 
cities can serve as laboratories, much in the way states have long 
been viewed, for testing creative ideas and new ways of 
encouraging business, handling governance, and providing for the 
administration of public goods and services.91  
With such trumpets and fanfare in the background, cities 
have found themselves in the position of not only trying to 
survive since the Great Recession, but also newly crowned with 
the laurels of the hero—an institution best able and ready to be 
America’s problem solvers.92 One noted commentator states that 
cities are taking the lead in a myriad of ways that were once 
unthought of.93 In fact, many of the policy objectives once 
advanced chiefly (if not exclusively) by the federal or state 
governments are now on the municipal policy agenda.94 These 
include programs that address climate change or environmental 
regulations that are implicated by the population densities within 
their borders.95 This also includes innovations in the way public 
transportation is provided so as to meet these population needs.96 
                                                                                                     
 90. See Nadav Shoked, Quasi-Cities, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1971, 2028 (2013) 
(proposing that quasi-cities will lead to greater self-determination). 
 91.  See id. at 2010 (listing the benefits of experimentation at the local 
level); Sue Siegel, Cities as Laboratories, Discovering America’s Healthcare 
Solutions, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 2, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.huffington 
post.com/sue-siegel/cities-as-laboratories-di_b_4032819.html (last updated Dec. 
2, 2013, 5:12 AM) (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (supplying examples of how local 
communities of “colleagues, communities, and companies” have worked together 
to solve problems with health care) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 92. See Parisella, supra note 54 (“It is becoming increasingly obvious that 
large cities are centers of economic, political, cultural, and community life.”). 
 93.  See id. (“[C]ities and their first administrators are being called upon to 
play a greater role on issues.”).  
 94. See id. (describing the increased role that cities have had in addressing 
environmental issues). 
 95. See id. (“Whether it has to do with climate change or other 
environmental concerns, it is obvious that large cities have greater 
responsibility.”). 
 96. See id. (describing New York City and Montreal’s plan for a high-speed 
rail network). 
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And certainly in the wake of the financial crisis cities were 
expected—and often did—take a leading role in attempting to 
address unemployment issues through engaging in direct or 
indirect job creation efforts.97 When crime and unrest was on the 
rise due to stresses brought about by the downturn, local 
governments and their partners responded with increased 
security and innovative safety initiatives, as well as provided 
counseling and related social services to help people cope with 
mental illness and with getting back on their feet.98 And lastly, 
cities provide the primary showcase for the arts and culture, both 
of which are so vital to a happy and fulfilled society.99 
In essence, many scholars and policy advocates often 
reference the idea of the “resilient” city and its growing role in 
the post-recession world.100 Cities are challenged with 
formulating ways to be resilient and robust in a variety of 
situations so as to fulfill these newfound expectations.101 
C. Economic and Public Finance Pressures 
But of all the expectations imposed upon local governments 
in this age of city resiliency, none has taken center stage more 
than the deep-seated hunger to create jobs and encourage 
economic development.102 And this is particularly true with 
regard to bringing in and fostering new commercial enterprises, 
                                                                                                     
 97. See id. (explaining the link between a city’s quality of life and job 
creation). 
 98. See id. (linking the closeness of city officials to their ability to 
effectively assist citizens). 
 99. See id. (drawing a link between artistic communities and city 
leadership).  
 100. For more information on the “resilient” city concept, see supra note 81.  
 101. See id. (listing the new challenges that cities face including 
transportation, climate change, and job creation).  
 102. See DOUGLAS J. WATSON, THE NEW CIVIL WAR: GOVERNMENT 
COMPETITION FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 3–10 (1995) (exploring whether local 
economic development is appropriate and necessary); Rebecca Hendrick, 
Yonghong Wu & Benoy Jacob, Tax Competition Among Municipal Governments: 
Exit Versus Voice, 43 URB. AFF. REV. 221, 221–55 (2007), 
http://uar.sagepub.com/content/43/2/221 (exploring tax competition between 
cities in the context of sales and property taxes). 
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retail outlets, and residential developments.103 Importantly, these 
developments are essential to a city’s bottom line.104 With tax 
revenues down so precipitously, creating new streams of tax 
monies is critical not only to fulfilling the economic recovery 
expectations imposed upon cities, but also to the survival of the 
municipality itself.105 New developments help drive up property 
values that, in turn, result in higher property tax realizations for 
the local government.106 And the development of previously 
blighted property—from which the city derives little (if any) 
property revenues at all—is especially beneficial.107 By extension, 
as more individuals live, conduct business, and play within the 
city’s borders, sales-tax revenues also rise.108 
But the fiercest foes that cities face in terms of their 
economic development efforts are, in fact, one another.109 Every 
city faces the challenges associated with decreasing tax revenues 
and the need to find new sources of public funding.110 Similarly, 
all cities are feeling the pressure, both public and political, to step 
up to the plate as leaders in the American economic recovery.111 
                                                                                                     
 103. See Watson, supra note 102, at 3–8 (explaining the role of local 
governments in development). 
 104. See Hongbin Cai & Daniel Treisman, Does Competition for Capital 
Discipline Governments? Decentralization, Globalization, and Public Policy, 95 
AM. ECON. REV. 817, 817 (2005), (describing the view that “competition for 
capital motivates governments to reduce their corruption, waste, and 
inefficiency, and to provide more growth-promoting infrastructure”). 
 105. See Jonathan House, U.S. Cities Still Reeling from Great Recession, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2013, 6:17 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/ 
2013/10/23/u-s-cities-still-reeling-from-great-recession/ (last visited Mar. 30, 
2015) (explaining how cities post-recession have struggled to raise their revenue 
to pre-crisis levels) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 106. See Watson, supra note 102, at 62–65 (describing how and why states 
offer tax incentives to industries). 
 107. See id. at 18–31 (listing the development activities that a city can 
undertake and exploring their impact). 
 108. See id. (describing the benefits of increased economic development). 
 109. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 233 (describing the role of competition in 
the marketplace theory of local government). 
 110. See id. (describing the challenges that a city faces in raising revenue); 
Watson, supra note 102, at 5 (giving reasons why cities focus on economic 
development). 
 111. See Parisella, supra note 54 (explaining how cities have taken an 
increased role in public policies). 
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With only so many economic development opportunities to go 
around, cities often compete with one another for the same 
projects.112 In the waning days of negotiations to land a large 
industrial plant, a mega-manufacturing facility, or a new tech 
headquarters, millions upon millions of taxpayer dollars—both in 
the forms of direct grants and in various indirect subsidiaries—
are offered to the target enterprise.113 
III. An Arrow in the Arsenal: The Special Taxing District 
One type of particularly popular public incentive program 
used by cities in their quest to boast real estate investment, and 
the subject of this Article, is the special taxing district like that 
enjoyed by Beau Chateaux.114 These are special purpose sub-
districts of the larger municipality, which are governed by their 
own board or commission and operate as a sort of mini-local 
government that performs certain narrow functions.115  
                                                                                                     
 112. See Watson, supra note 102, at 35–36 (“The competition for the limited 
number of new jobs created in this country each year, especially in 
manufacturing, has been an important factor in the increased emphasis on 
economic development among local governments.”). 
 113. See Louise Story, Michigan Town Woos Hollywood, but Ends Up With a 
Bit Part, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/us/ 
when-hollywood-comes-to-town.html?_r=0 (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (giving an 
example of how tax incentives may backfire on a town) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Louise Story, Lines Blur as Texas Gives 
Industries a Bonanza, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ 
12/03/us/winners-and-losers-in-texas.html?page wanted=all (last visited Mar. 
30, 2015) (finding that Texas gives out more tax incentives than any other state 
at $19 billion per year) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Louise Story, As Companies Seek Tax Deals, Governments Pay High Price, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/02/us/how-local-
taxpayers-bankroll-corporations.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (explaining 
how municipalities are willing to give tax breaks to corporations in the hopes of 
creating jobs) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 114. See Sara C. Galvan, Wrestling with MUDS to Pin Down the Truth 
About Special Districts, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3042 (2007) (listing the 
benefits of special districts). 
 115. See Kenneth A. Stahl, Neighborhood Empowerment and the Future of 
the City, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 939, 941–46 (2013) (describing the characteristics of 
neighborhood zoning districts and of special assessment districts). 
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The impact of special taxing districts on local government 
can hardly be understated.116 One commentator notes that there 
are roughly as many special districts as there are counties, towns, 
and cities across the United States combined.117 Moreover, these 
districts have achieved roughly $175 billion in expenditures and 
have incurred approximately $293 billion in debt obligations.118 
Although they have traditionally served a more generic 
governmental function—such as for roads, bridges, fire services, 
and the like—they have been increasingly used for an assortment 
of different purposes.119 One of these includes their use for real 
estate development—called for purposes of this Article 
“development special districts.”120 These districts were meant to 
provide a financing mechanism whereby the property owners 
within the geographic district would pay for certain essential 
infrastructure improvements through long-term debt obligations 
on each lot in the form of a special assessment on their property 
tax bills.121  
However, over time, municipalities, in their desire to 
aggressively compete and attract investors and developers to 
their locales, have meted out development special districts to 
private developers to finance an assortment of private amenities 
and luxuries that extend far beyond what these districts were 
originally intended to support.122 And this public give away has 
                                                                                                     
 116. See Shoked, supra note 90, at 2003–11 (focusing on the normative 
benefits of quasi-cities including special taxing districts). 
 117. Id. at 1992–93 (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2012 CENSUS OF 
GOVERNMENTS: ORGANIZATION COMPONENT ESTIMATES tbl.2, 
http://www.census.gov//govs/cog2012). 
 118. Id. at 1977 (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2007 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS: 
FINANCE, http://www.census.gov//govs/cog/historical_data& uscore;2007.html.). 
 119. See Stephen R. Miller, Legal Neighborhoods, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
105, 143–56 (2013) (presenting the increased breadth and scope of tools 
available to districts in making policies). 
 120. See generally id. (addressing how neighborhoods should be used to 
address various public policies).  
 121. See id. at 109–13 (chronicling the raise of neighborhoods). See generally 
Callies, supra note 27 (describing the uses for tax-increment financing). 
 122. See Griffith, supra note 31, at 956–61 (explaining the rapidly expanding 
role of special districts); Fineout, supra note 22 (describing the importance of 
tax-exempt bonds for one Florida community). 
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had disastrous results, with portents of greater ills on the 
horizon.123 
A. The History and Uses of Special Taxing Districts 
Special taxing districts in general have played an important 
role in the history of the country.124 These districts are created 
either directly by the state legislature or, more frequently, by 
individual local governments.125 Professor Sara Galvan noted that 
the first special district appeared in Rhode Island in 1797 in the 
form of the East Greenwich Fire District and provided fire 
services to a handful of properties in the area.126 Their growth 
since then can hardly be understated. 
1. Background and Early Iterations 
Special taxing districts continued sprouting up throughout 
the 1800s to provide financing and to operate “toll roads, canals, 
and bridges.”127 The general theory behind the creation of these 
special purpose sublocal governments was that municipalities 
were not equipped to handle functions with such a specific scope 
and that these infrastructure items should not be supported by 
general government funds.128 Mid-nineteenth century courts 
espoused this approach as being entirely reasonable and that 
                                                                                                     
 123. See generally Ritchie, supra note 22; White, supra note 13. 
 124. See Shoked, supra note 90, at 1977–90 (providing a history of special 
districts). 
 125. See id. at 1977 (describing how state legislatures may either “pass a 
special act” or a “general law” in order to create special districts (citing N.Y. 
GEN. MUN. LAW §§ 975, 990 (McKinney 2012))). 
 126. See id. at 1977 n.22 (“In the Philadelphia area, starting in 1790, special 
authorities were created for prison administration, port development, public 
health control, education, and police. By 1850, there were ten such districts.” 
(citing METROPOLITAN ANALYSIS 83 (Stephen B. Sweeney ed., 1958)). 
 127. Id. at 1978. 
 128. See id. (explaining how state legislatures designed funding for projects 
that were not receiving funds from the “general budget of an existing local 
government” (citing Bd. of Comm’rs v. Harrell, 46 N.E. 124, 125–27 (Ind. 
1897))). 
738 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 707 (2015) 
local governments would need from time to time to create 
“dissimilar corporate authorities, . . . imbued with administrative 
functions of a nature which could not be properly exercised” by 
the existing local government.129  
Of course, the particular power that makes special districts 
so effective is their ability to levy a tax upon the parcels of land 
within the bounds of the district itself.130 In the early days of 
special taxing districts, numerous lawsuits were filed to challenge 
this essential characteristic; however, courts quickly rebuffed 
them.131 Judges regularly denied claims that the local or state 
legislature had exceeded its authority in vesting the taxing power 
in these sublocal structures.132 As an example, the Illinois 
Supreme Court, in a particularly sweeping 1869 holding, 
articulated the growing opinion of state courts across the country 
with regard to special taxing districts: “There is no 
prohibition . . . against the creation by the legislature, of every 
conceivable description of corporate authority, and when created 
to endow them with all the faculties and attributes of other pre-
existing corporate authorities.”133 This broad view of legislative 
authority included even the power to take certain powers and 
functions away from existing public entities and reallocate them 
to special taxing districts.134 Therefore, functions that were once 
carried out by local governments could be taken away and 
thereafter vested in these special purpose districts, without 
limitation.135 
                                                                                                     
 129. See id. (explaining the rationale that was endorsed by the Illinois 
Supreme Court (citing People ex rel. Wilson v. Salomon, 51 Ill. 37, 50 (1869))). 
 130. See id. at 1979 (describing the districts’ power to assess and collect 
taxes). 
 131. See id. (detailing the legal challenges that legislatures faced). 
 132. See id. (describing two cases where courts upheld the power of the 
legislature to create special districts).  
 133. Id. (citing People ex rel. Wilson v. Salomon, 51 Ill. 37, 50 (1869)). 
 134. See id. (describing how courts came to adopt the view that the 
legislature could reallocate government functions to other districts (citing Straw 
v. Harris, 103 P. 777, 781–82 (Or. 1909); State ex rel. Baltzell v. Stewart, 43 
N.W. 947, 949 (Wis. 1889))). 
 135. See id. at 1980 (explaining the broad view that courts adopted 
regarding the use of “corporate authorities” (citing Gilson v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 27 
N.E. 235, 237 (Ind. 1891); Bowles v. State, 37 Ohio St. 35, 42 (1881))). 
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2. Challenges and New Deal Proliferation 
The next wave of challenges to special taxing districts came 
in the form of attempts to cabin their powers and to prescribe the 
limits of what they could accomplish.136 However, these 
challenges, like the initial attacks on their creation, were equally 
unavailing.  
Opponents first argued that the constitutional right to vote 
was inherently violated by the special taxing district structure.137 
The general view was that the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution required one person, one vote, but that special 
districts’ voting power was allocated pursuant to the number of 
properties one owned within the geographic district.138 However, 
courts fired back that special taxing districts operated outside 
this constitutional rule such that voting power could be allocated 
based on land or other economic interests, which would otherwise 
be impossible under the traditional American governmental 
structure.139 Moreover, in many cases elections in special districts 
would be avoided altogether due to the district’s enabling 
legislation that provided for a governing board appointed by the 
city council or the legislature rather than one popularly 
elected.140  
Challengers of special districts also frequently argued that 
the use of funds raised by a district’s bond issuance violated state 
constitutional limitations on the levying and use of public 
                                                                                                     
 136. See id. at 1987–89 (explaining how special districts had more latitude 
in their powers to restrict the rights of its residents).  
 137. See id. at 1987 (describing how “[s]pecial districts . . . are for the most 
part exempt” from traditional right to vote jurisprudence).  
 138. See id. (describing how traditional government entities have been 
subject to the one person, one vote principle (citing Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 
U.S. 474, 476 (1968))). 
 139. See id. (noting that special districts are primarily exempt from this rule 
(citing Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 370 (1981); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake 
Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 728 (1973))). 
 140. Id. (citing Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 111 (1967); Ehm v. Bd. 
of Trs. of Metro. Rapid Transit Auth., 251 F. App’x 930, 932 (5th Cir. 2007); 
Atlanta v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 636 F.2d 1084, 1089 (5th Cir. 
1981); Van Zanen v. Keydel, 280 N.W.2d 535, 538–39 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979); 
People ex rel. Vermilion Cnty. Conservation Dist. v. Lenover, 251 N.E.2d 175, 
177 (Ill. 1969)). 
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monies.141 Most state constitutions provide restrictions on how 
much the state and any of its corporate constituencies can 
borrow, as well as a proviso that any borrowing must be for a 
public purpose and that the funds be used in furtherance of a 
public benefit.142 However, courts and special district advocates 
found ways around these constraints as well.143 
First, the public purpose requirement was interpreted to 
extend to the amelioration of “ills to be corrected through the use 
of public funding of measures with even substantial private 
benefit.”144 These would include things like the improvement of 
blighted properties and the development of areas that had 
traditionally been cut off from conventional lending.145 With 
regard to complaints about exceeding debt limitations, courts also 
found ways to distinguish special taxing districts.146 Special 
districts were deemed “financially autonomous” because they had 
their own dedicated revenue stream derived from the special 
assessments.147 Because they operated independently from the 
municipal government, they deserved treatment separate and 
apart from the restrictions on the local government itself.148 This 
jurisprudential exception became known as the public authority 
doctrine and was used by special taxing districts to avoid legal 
debt limits that otherwise restricted the borrowing of local and 
state governments.149 
                                                                                                     
 141. See Callies, supra note 27, at 3–4 (providing the background history of 
tax-increment financing). 
 142. See id. (describing state’s efforts to limit districts’ taxing power).  
 143. See id. (“Most TIF enabling statutes declare that tax increment bonds 
are not debt or an obligation of the local government subject to constitutional 
debt limitation provisions.”).  
 144. See id. (citing In re House Bill 91S-1005, 814 P.2d 875 (Colo. 1991); 
Gude v. City of Lakewood, 636 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1981)). 
 145. See id. (explaining that public purpose includes urban renewal).  
 146. See id. (“[S]tate courts have developed judicial doctrines that evade 
constitutional debt limitations.”).  
 147. See id. (defining the public authority doctrine (citing AMDURSKY & 
GILETTE, MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW § 4.12 (2001))). 
 148. See id. (“[T]he debts of independent public authorities are their own 
and are not the debt of underling local government.”).  
 149. See id. (explaining the loophole and lack of electoral accountability 
created by the public authority doctrine (citing Robert H. Bowmar, The 
Anachronism Called Debt Limitations, 52 IOWA L. REV. 863 (1967); C. Robert 
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Another jurisprudential exception to the debt-ceiling problem 
was the special fund doctrine.150 Under this framework, because 
the monies generated by the special district were held in a 
“separate fund,” they were not considered to be within the ambit 
of constitutional debt.151 “Revenue bonds backed by a special 
fund, rather than by the government’s full faith and credit, are 
exempt from debt ceilings and referenda requirements because a 
bondholder’s only recourse is against the special fund itself and 
not against the local government.”152 This doctrine involved 
reconceptualizing the assessments levied by the district as a form 
of “self-financing” rather than as a tax in the traditional sense, 
thereby placing them outside normal legal constraints.153 
By the end of the Great Depression and during the time of 
the New Deal Era, “there were over 8,500 special districts across 
the nation.”154 Much of this sudden proliferation arose due to the 
efforts of the federal government.155 Although initially conceived 
                                                                                                     
Morris, Jr., Evading Debt Limitations with Public Building Authorities: The 
Costly Subversion of State Constitutions, 68 YALE L.J. 234 (1958))). 
 150. See id. (“A ‘special fund’ is a segregated account within a local 
government that receives revenue raised from a source separate from the state 
or local government’s general tax revenues, in particular, ad valorem property 
taxes.”). 
 151. See id. (explaining the reasoning of courts that have found special 
funds to be constitutional (citing GELFAND, supra note 6, § 9:11)). 
 152. Id.  
 153. See id. (describing why some courts have found tax increments to be a 
special source of revenue). 
 154. Shoked, supra note 90, at 1986 (citing WILLIAM ANDERSON, THE UNITS 
OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 37 (rev. ed. 1942)). 
 155. See id. at 1986–87  
The Reclamation Act of 1902 authorized large-scale participation by 
the national government in rural irrigation projects. Within a few 
years, the Federal Bureau of Reclamation began to push for the 
amendment of state laws and the passage of national legislation that 
would encourage the creation of irrigation districts and permit the 
irrigation districts to enter into contracts with the federal 
government. A similar pattern developed with respect to the other 
two prominent districts founded by general laws at the time: housing 
districts and soil conservation districts. With respect to housing 
districts, the most important catalyst to their creation and spread 
was the federal Housing Act of 1937. The Act offered federal subsidies 
to local initiatives, and New Dealers in Washington made little effort 
to conceal their preference for dealing with special districts rather 
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as part of nation-wide irrigation, housing, and conservation 
initiatives, federal policymakers preferred to work with and 
channel federal dollars into special taxing districts rather than 
larger municipalities, which the Roosevelt administration viewed 
as being “hopelessly indebted and inefficient.”156  
The special district was praised by New Dealers for being 
“apolitical, specialized, service oriented, and public interest 
minded,” and run by professionals and subject matter experts, 
rather than subject to the wrangling and corruption of traditional 
city and county governments.157  
Special district commentators such as Professors Shoked, 
Griffith, Galvan, Stahl, Briffault, and Miller all note that courts 
have been very deferential to legislators in sanctioning the 
creation of special taxing districts.158 Even as their uses have 
slowly shifted over time from single function entities to multi-
purpose mini-governments, there has been little effort to reign in 
their otherwise unfettered powers.159 In fact, if anything, courts 
and lawmakers have become increasingly liberal throughout the 
history of special taxing districts insofar as defining the limits of 
what they can be created to do and the tools which they can 
utilize to achieve their goals.160 They are neither county nor city, 
                                                                                                     
than cities. 
 156. Id. at 1987 (citing MARTIN J. SCHIESL, THE POLITICS OF EFFICIENCY 46–
59 (1977)). 
 157. See id. (noting that the idea of “expertise-driven government” was 
particularly appealing in the New Deal Era (citing DOROTHY ROSS, THE 
ORIGINALS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1991))). 
 158. Id. For more information on these commentators’ views, see Stahl, 
supra note 115; Miller, supra note 119; Briffault, supra note 85; Shoked, supra 
note 90; Griffith, supra note 31; Galvan, supra note 114. For additional 
discussion on the role of special districts in the context of the public financing of 
private development, see Darien Shanske, Above All Else Stop Digging: Local 
Government Law as a (Partial) Cause of (and Solution to) the Current Housing 
Crisis, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 663 (2010); Darien Shanske, Public Dollars for 
Private Suburban Development: A First Report on a National Phenomenon, 26 
VA. TAX REV. 709 (2007).  
 159. See generally Shoked, supra note 90, at 1990–92. 
 160. See id. (listing the factors that a court will consider in determining 
special district status (citing Floyd v. Mayor of Balt., 966 A.2d 900, 913 (Md. 
2009); Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Canaveral Port Auth., 642 So. 2d 1097, 1100–01 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895C cmt. a 
(1977))). 
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neither village nor town, yet they are more than a homeowners’ 
association or other private group.161 Further, they have all of the 
attributes of a regular corporate body.162 They can sue, be sued, 
enter into contracts, and acquire and dispose of property and its 
various appurtenances.163 In some cases, the special district even 
has the power of eminent domain.164 Special taxing districts 
possess special features that exempt them from traditional 
democratic parameters, yet they enjoy the privileges and 
attributes of private enterprises.165 And it is through this quasi-
public, quasi-private status that they have become both so very 
enticing and so very dangerous.166 
3. The Rise of Varied Special District Uses 
As the twentieth century marched forward, special districts 
only continued to rise in popularity.167 Numerous special purpose 
taxing districts were created to cover services such as parks, 
ports, airports, flood control, library maintenance, cemeteries, 
transportation, emergency services, and an ever-widening array 
of public infrastructure projects.168  
One popular and heretofore different form included the 
business improvement district (BID), which is a special taxing 
district, the funds from which are used to pay for not only 
                                                                                                     
 161. Id. (citing Craig D. Feiser, Protecting the Public’s Right to Know: The 
Debate over Privatization and Access to Government Information Under State 
Law, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825, 835–36 (2000)). 
 162. See Callies, supra note 27, at 1–3 (describing the legal status of special 
districts). 
 163. See id. (listing the legal powers of special districts). 
 164. See id. (enumerating the broad powers of special districts).  
 165. See Stahl, supra note 115, at 942–44 (explaining how cities have 
granted special districts a diverse range of powers to operate under). 
 166. See id. at 943–45 (describing one problem with special districts as the 
fact that they “often cause troubling inequalities between wealthy and poor 
neighborhoods in the provision of city services”); see generally Miller, supra note 
119; Briffault, supra note 85; Shoked, supra note 90. 
 167. See Briffault, supra note 85, at 503–09 (describing the rise in popularity 
of special districts). 
 168. See Shoked, supra note 90, at 1972–73 (listing various purposes of 
special districts); see also Galvan, supra note 114, at 3042 (same). 
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traditional services such as drainage and sanitation, but also for 
security patrols and street maintenance and repairs.169 The first 
BID is generally believed to have been the New Orleans 
Downtown Development District, created in 1975, and their 
popularity increased tremendously in the following decades.170 In 
general, “BIDs operate parking facilities [and] maintain public 
amenities,” which include the construction of “streets, sidewalks, 
fountains, street lights, benches, and other forms of street 
furniture.”171 One noted such BID is the one around New York 
City’s Times Square area that funds homeless prevention and 
mitigation efforts.172 In fact, at one time in the mid-1990s, Grand 
Central Station infamously used its own BID monies to “drive 
homeless people” from the area.173  
The BID was the beginning of the use of special taxing 
districts as a sort of economic development tool.174 They were 
used to help attract and maintain businesses within a certain 
area—usually downtown—and would often engage in projects 
that were meant to promote the commercial and business-related 
activities of those operating within its geographic boundaries.175 
In many ways, BIDs operated like “private chambers of 
commerce” that used the coercive powers of property taxation to 
fund their operations, even though they lacked the limitations 
and mandates of the larger municipal government.176  
                                                                                                     
 169. See Briffault, supra note 85, at 517–19 (listing the non-traditional 
activities that business improvement districts undertake). 
 170. Miller, supra note 119, at 148. 
 171. Briffault, supra note 85, at 518. 
 172. See id. at 518–19 (“New York’s Time Square BID provides services to 
the homeless” (citing 1 N.Y.C DEP’T OF BUS. SERVS., NEW YORK CITY BUSINESS 
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS 59 (Aug. 1996))). 
 173. See id. at 519 (describing a 1995 controversy in which it was alleged 
that BIDs were attempting to drive people out of Grand Central and 
“functioning as a ‘goon squad’” (citing Heather MacDonald, BIDs Really Work, 
CITY J., Spring 1996, at 29, 40). 
 174. See id. (linking BIDs to efforts to improve the “business climate within 
the districts”).  
 175.  See id. (describing how BIDS used these efforts to “attract and retain 
business”).  
 176.  See id. (explaining the tools used by BIDs to attract commerce).  
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But even the BID played a small part in the rise of the purely 
private use of special taxing districts compared to those special 
taxing districts that arose, first in California and then later in 
Texas and other western states, to fund neighborhood 
improvements.177 In California in the 1980s, a referendum was 
passed called Proposition 13 that put a state-wide cap on all ad 
valorem property taxes.178 This greatly hamstrung the ability of 
local governments to fund critical infrastructure needs 
throughout the state.179 In response, the California Legislature 
passed the Community Facilities Act—commonly known as the 
Mello-Roose Act—which allowed the creation of special taxing 
districts, separate and apart from the larger municipality, which 
would have the ability to impose and increase taxes within 
neighborhood-sized districts in order to fund infrastructure such 
as streets, lighting, sewers, and even schools.180 
Similarly, the Texas constitution was altered in 1971 to 
authorize the creation of municipal utility districts (MUDs).181 As 
with community facility districts in California, these small 
geographic districts were used to fund infrastructure within 
certain discrete neighborhoods that would otherwise have been 
paid for by the municipality.182 MUDs have been hugely popular 
in Texas.183 By one account, there are nearly 1,000 such districts 
in Texas, and they encompass over 500 acres of land, with the 
Houston area alone having several hundred.184 
                                                                                                     
 177. See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3042–45 (describing how special 
districts are used in Texas); Miller, supra note 119, at 137–40 (describing how 
California has used special districts). 
 178. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 53311–53368.3 (Deering 2011) (providing an 
alternative method of financing public facilities and services); Miller, supra note 
119, at 148–49 (describing why special districts arose in California).  
 179. See Miller, supra note 119, at 148–49 (explaining how Proposition 13 
capped property taxes). 
 180. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 53311–53317.5 (2015); see also Miller, supra note 
119, at 148–49 (explaining how Mello-Roos operated). Arizona, Washington, and 
Hawaii also passed similar acts. Id.  
 181. See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3044–45 (“The Texas constitution was 
amended to provide for the establishment of water districts in the early part of 
the twentieth century.”).  
 182. See id. (explaining how MUDs operated in Texas). 
 183. See id. at 3045 (“[A]bout 950 MUDs exist in Texas.”). 
 184. Id. 
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The idea that special taxing districts could be used for 
purposes other than traditional municipal infrastructure such as 
bridges, roads, drainage, and the like took hold in a powerful 
way, and local governments and special district enthusiasts 
began to imagine a wider array of services and functions being 
exercised by these unique quasi-public, quasi-private 
governmental appendages.185  
B. An Overview of Development Special Districts 
The premise that underlies the special taxing district used in 
connection with private real estate developments (development 
special districts) rests on the basic notion, as expressed by 
Professor Stahl, that residents generally desire to control 
neighborhood externalities.186 They want to have some level of 
power over what their neighbors do, how the environment around 
them is built, and how everyday interactions with outside 
variables operate.187  
When individuals began to feel a diminished amount of 
control and input in the larger municipal governance structure, 
they looked to a more localized approach as a way to overcome 
feelings of being looked over or left out.188 Although all persons 
within the local government’s jurisdiction contributed their share 
of ad valorem property taxes, the uses to which these funds were 
put were not always uniform and, some felt, likewise not in their 
best interest.189 Homeowners’ associations seemed like the 
answer because they allowed for a form of quasi-government 
among likeminded individuals.190 The use of deed restrictions and 
                                                                                                     
 185. See generally id. 
 186. See Stahl, supra note 115, at 947–49 (explaining why neighborhoods 
“prize the ability to bring in positive externalities . . . and to keep out negative 
externalities” (citing ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS (2008); 
N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECOOMICS 195–213 (2008)). 
 187. See id. (listing the concerns of homeowners and how they interact with 
their neighbors’ actions). 
 188. See id. at 948 (describing why and how homeowners seek power). 
 189. See id. (describing how land use and improvements can affect 
residential property values).  
 190. See id. at 948–49 (describing why homeowners’ associations helped 
 
SUPER-LIENS TO THE RESCUE? 747 
land covenants ensured that dues were paid and that their 
collection could be enforced.191 The funds raised could be used to 
build improvements such as golf courses, tennis courts, 
swimming pools, and other neighborhood amenities.192 The idea 
that private, localized individuals could and should control their 
immediate environment, rather than leaving such functions to 
the larger local government, built the foundation for the 
proliferation of the development special district.193 
For most of its history, the special taxing district, when used 
for infrastructure projects, would cover a large area and everyone 
within that district would pay assessments in order to receive a 
particularized benefit. It may have been to obtain sanitary sewer 
services, water network distribution, or fire and safety services. 
An important distinction between the use of these districts and 
those known as development special districts is that the 
development districts came to include a smaller and more 
particularized area, often encompassing only a discreet, 
homogeneous development.  
1. Mechanics of Special District Funding 
The way in which development special districts work can 
seem fairly complex, but in fact it is no different than the way all 
other special taxing districts operate.194 In general, development 
special districts use long-term bond financing to fund their 
projects.195 The setup involves the district’s governing board 
commissioning a revenue study to determine the borrowing 
capacity of the district based on its future stream of property tax 
                                                                                                     
address the issues of neighborhoods). 
 191. See id. at 949 (explaining how homeowners’ associations exercised their 
power). 
 192. See id. (listing the improvements that a homeowners’ association could 
initiate).  
 193. See id. at 951 (explaining how special districts have been crafted to 
keep control localized). 
 194. See Griffith, supra note 31, at 956–61 (describing how special districts 
are managed). 
 195. See id. at 966–97 (laying out the financing method for infrastructure 
development districts). 
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assessment revenues over time.196 After the bond issuance, an 
underwriter purchases or markets the bonds to third party 
investors such as large financial institutions, pensions, or 
retirement funds.197 The funds generated from the sale of the 
bonds are then used by the district to pay for the infrastructure 
or other special purpose projects.198 Over time, the collection of 
the tax assessments on each of the parcels within the district goes 
toward retiring the debt on the bonds.199 Thus, the district is able 
to obtain money immediately through the issuance of these debt 
instruments, build the improvements immediately, and pay them 
back over the course of time.200 Also, the burden of paying for 
these residential infrastructure projects is shifted from the local 
government and its general fund to only the owners of the parcels 
being benefited.201  
These debt instruments are considered by courts to be 
revenue bonds, meaning that payment under the bonds is secured 
by a particular and limited stream of revenue—specifically, the 
special district’s property tax assessments.202 In other words, no 
larger governmental general fund or credit worthiness is 
implicated in the bond issuance.203 Hence, when special district X 
that lies within county Y issues bonds, the repayment of those 
bonds is secured only by the assessments from district X, and 
county Y’s revenue streams are not at all implicated.204 While 
investors prefer municipal bonds—which are secured by the more 
affluent and resource-rich county Y—revenue bonds are still very 
                                                                                                     
 196. See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3060 (describing how Texas’ districts are 
funded through tax-exempt bonds). 
 197. Callies, supra note 27, at 1–3. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See id. (“[T]he arrangements tend to shift the risk of project failure 
from the local government and its taxpayers to the developers and 
bondholders.”).  
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See id. (describing how risk is segmented). 
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attractive, as the interest on revenue bonds is exempt from both 
federal and state taxation.205  
The deal could not be better for the developer.206 He gets to 
use special district financing to construct the infrastructure and 
improvements as he dictates with no cost to him whatsoever.207 
The district issues the bonds, and the future owners of the land 
assume the long-term debt obligation.208 Meanwhile, the profits 
from the sale of the parcels (as in a residential subdivision) go to 
the developer.209 
2. Framework for Special District Lien Enforcement 
Payment of the special assessments is enforced by the 
district’s liens on the parcels within the district.210 In the event 
that a homeowner fails to pay his special district assessment, his 
parcel is then encumbered by a lien in favor of the district, which 
remains on the property until the amount is paid in full.211 The 
district can foreclose on a homeowner who fails to pay the 
assessment—as between creditor (district) and debtor 
(homeowner), the lien resembles a typical mortgage, lien, or other 
conventional security device.212 
But as between this creditor and other creditors, this lien is 
not like just any conventional security device, subject to the 
normal rules of recordation, third party rights, and priority.213 
                                                                                                     
 205. See id. (listing factors that an investor may consider prior to making an 
investment). 
 206. See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3048 (“[R]eal estate developments have 
become [the districts’] most vocal advocates and have received most of their 
benefits.”). 
 207. See id. at 3048–49 (describing the process through which the developers 
and districts go through the funding process). 
 208. Id.  
 209. See Callies, supra note 27, at 1–3 (describing what a corporation has to 
gain from coordinating with special districts). 
 210. Id. 
 211. See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3048 (noting that real estate developers 
receive the most benefit from these special districts). 
 212. See id. at 3048–51 (listing the powers of special districts). 
 213. See id. at 3048 (explaining the powers and rights that are unique to 
special district developers and financiers). 
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Rather, this lien is given the same supremacy over pre-existing 
liens and property rights as the ad valorem property tax lien.214  
For instance, a developer may obtain a traditional bank loan 
in order to purchase real property for his development and, in 
exchange, grant a mortgage on the property to the bank. Then, in 
order to construct the infrastructure, he will have a special taxing 
district created to fund the improvements. The district’s board, 
which he controls, will issue the bonds and raise the funds. The 
assessments on the parcels within the development will fund the 
debt service going forward. However, if the developer fails to pay 
his special assessment on any particular parcel, then a lien will 
automatically be created on that parcel. And this lien, which 
arose long after the bank’s mortgage, will jump over the bank’s 
rights in the line of ranking and give the district—or more 
particularly, the bondholders—a first position as to the collateral. 
Therefore, the special district lien’s superpriority status ensures 
that even conventional liens that arise before the special district 
lien attaches to the property are nonetheless inferior to the rights 
of the district.215 
3. Structuring of Special District Governance 
The fact that real estate developers are the major force 
behind development special district creation is of no surprise.216 
The statutory framework that allows for the creation of these 
structures is geared toward the developer’s benefit—specifically 
in the way the district’s board is governed.217 The example of how 
the Texas MUD is created is instructive because it is emblematic 
of how most all development special districts are crafted.218 The 
                                                                                                     
 214. See id. (describing how the rights of these creditors are protected). 
 215. See id. (describing how the rights of certain creditors are protected).  
 216. See id. (noting that real estate developers receive the most benefit from 
these special districts). 
 217. See id. (describing how MUDs tend to be run by a board of real estate 
developers). 
 218. See id. at 3048–49 (listing the steps for MUD formation). Professor 
Galvan gives an extensive and authoritative review of Texas’s MUDs and 
explains how they, in many ways, represent the larger world of special taxing 
districts nationally. Id. 
SUPER-LIENS TO THE RESCUE? 751 
statutory provisions that allow for the creation of MUDs are 
relaxed at best.219 There are basically only four steps in the 
process: “(1) a landowner petition, (2) a review by a state agency, 
(3) a city or county review, and (4) an election.”220 Because at the 
beginning of the life of every real estate development the 
developer owns all the land, only his assent is needed to initiate 
the petition.221 The petition is then reviewed by the Texas 
Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) that analyzes the 
request in light of “projected construction projects, tax rates, and 
sewer rates,” among other things.222 Then the petition moves on 
to the municipal governing body for the jurisdiction where the 
district will be located for final approval.223  
As Professor Galvan notes, approval of the petition through 
these governmental processes often comes as a matter of 
course.224 This is true because, from the local government’s 
perspective, there will be no drain on the public purse resulting 
from the formation of the district—rather, the entity will be, in 
theory, self-sustaining.225 And even if the TCEQ and the local 
government refuse to give their consent to the district’s creation, 
the developer can also ask the legislature to create the district 
through a special statute, thereby side-stepping this multi-tiered 
(if only superficial) approval process entirely.226 
                                                                                                     
 219. See id. at 3049 (explaining how developers are able to take advantage of 
the lenient legal provisions in forming MUDs).  
 220. Id. at 3049–50. 
 221. See id. at 3050 (listing the steps necessary for MUD approval). 
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TEXAS WATER CODE ANN. § 54.021 (Vernon 2002)).  
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Once the petition is approved, a governing board is appointed 
by the city council, in accordance with the petition, to operate, to 
manage, and to make policy decisions on behalf of the special 
district.227 But instead of appointing members to the board from 
various sectors whose interests or expertise would lend credibility 
and reasoned judgment to the operation of the district, the 
individuals listed in the landowner’s petition are almost always 
appointed as a matter of course.228 And naturally, these include 
the developer’s associates, and, in the case of special legislatively-
created districts, the developer himself may be a board 
member.229 
Because the initial members of the district’s governing board 
are generally handpicked by the developer, they are, with little 
exception, supportive of his views and intentions with regard to 
the district.230 This includes going along with whatever bond 
issuance details or other financing mechanisms he intends to use 
to fund the development, as well as the extent and aggressiveness 
of the build-out of improvements.231 And even after the district’s 
board is turned over to the third-party owners of the parcels 
within the development,232 participation is consistently low.233 
                                                                                                     
Average Residents. Though Money Still Talks, Power Is Harder to Hold, FORT 
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept. 1, 2002, at 1)). 
 227. See id. at 3052–53 (discussing the components of special district 
litigation). 
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One commentator notes that “a turnout of two to five percent is 
‘unusually high’ for special district elections,” thereby giving a 
motivated developer a chance to control the district’s 
administration and processes many years later.234 
C. Development Special Districts as Economic Development Tools 
Over time, it became evident to developers that by 
partnering with local governments, special districts could be used 
to promote private real estate projects in new ways.235 Special 
taxing districts like MUDs and community development districts 
provided a perfect framework for these public financing 
devices.236 If they could be used to fund traditional neighborhood 
infrastructure and business development efforts, then why not 
use them as a source of capital for private development? In that 
vein, as discussed above, arose the development special district—
those special taxing districts that were essentially commandeered 
by private developers for the purpose of bank-rolling purely 
private projects—that extended far beyond the traditional roles 
for which they were initially envisioned.237 And local governments 
have been all too eager to embrace the development special 
district construct.238 In their view, these types of private real 
estate financing facilities were perfect—they imposed no 
obligations on the municipality, and there was no need to either 
directly fund the critical infrastructure improvements or 
indirectly guarantee the debt that was incurred in connection 
                                                                                                     
 234. See id. (exploring the lack of democratic participation in the 
development of special districts (citing NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: PRIVATE VALUES IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS 12 
(1994))). 
 235. See id. at 3043 (introducing the strategy of building private 
developments through local government units). 
 236. See id. at 3048 (explaining a few ways in which MUDs tax incoming 
landowners to fund the development of special districts). 
 237. See id. at 3061 (discussing the costs that private developers can recoup 
because of partnerships with local governments). 
 238. See id. at 3053 (describing a Texas court’s ruling that seemed to 
approve of the link between local governments and private development 
enterprises). 
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with their construction.239 The city was able to outsource the 
provision of government goods and services to these “quasi-
privatized entities [so as to] relieve the city of the need to finance 
such services.”240  
Further, if the development succeeded, new residents and 
subsequent property and sales tax revenues would follow.241 
Although the special assessments levied would only go toward 
benefits enjoyed by those living within the district, the spill-over 
effect of these new residents on surrounding businesses, 
entertainment venues, and tourism activities would generate new 
tax revenues for the municipality as a whole.242 And how could 
these special districts not be wildly successful considering the 
grand projections and attractive renderings presented by the 
developer when making his request to the city council?243 After 
all, many people believed—and particularly so now—that 
“smaller is better” and that the empowerment of local 
governments and the “reduction of the scale of decisionmaking” 
present an optimal scheme of governance.244 Cities have lauded 
development special districts as being, aside from self-financing, 
excellent bubbles in which true civic engagement and democratic 
idealism play out through better responsiveness, a closer 
connection to the people, and less bureaucracy.245 
                                                                                                     
 239. See id. at 3074–75 (“Through annexation of infrastructure-building 
districts like MUDs, cities can avoid the cost, management, and liabilities of 
constructing new infrastructure.”); see also Callies supra note 27, at 2 
(discussing the consequences of government-assisted private development). 
 240. See Stahl, supra note 115, at 984 (suggesting that more judicial 
oversight is required because cities have an incentive to outsource to private 
developments). 
 241. See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3044 (stating that special districts bring 
in a lot of revenue). 
 242. See Briffault, supra note 85, at 512 (explaining that while much of the 
revenues raised stay within the development, there is some spillover into the 
government). 
 243. See id. at 519 (discussing the need to demonstrate that a development 
will positively impact the area); Galvan, supra note 114, at 3050–51 (detailing 
the steps taken to get a special district development approved). 
 244. See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3047 (advocating that more local 
decision-making is preferable to that on a larger scale (citing Gerald E. Frug, 
The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980))). 
 245. See id. at 3048 (providing further support for the idea that smaller 
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So, according to the prevailing narrative, development 
special districts are good all around.246 For the developer, they 
allow for tax-exempt bond financing at a lower cost than 
financing available through conventional lenders.247 And of 
course, the debt undertaken in connection with building the 
improvements and infrastructure is off the books of the 
developer, since the debt is that of the district.248 The ultimate 
cost of the improvements need not come, as has traditionally been 
the case, from the sales proceeds from the lots within the 
development; rather, the long-term debt service obligations are 
supported by future owners over time.249 
Future homeowners are able to avail themselves of amenities 
and luxuries that the municipality would have never publicly 
supported or financed.250 And, because the bonded indebtedness 
is spread over the long-term assessment of special property taxes 
on the parcels, the purchase price of the properties need not be 
inflated to account for the need to repay the debt in the short 
term by the developer.251 
And lastly, for the municipality the development special 
district is an attractive economic development tool.252 They cost 
                                                                                                     
governments are preferable to large governments (citing Richard Thompson 
Ford, Beyond Borders: A Partial Response to Richard Briffault, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
1173 (1996))); see generally Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal 
Bargains, 76 N.Y.C. L. REV. 190 (2001). 
 246. See Feldman & Rolapp supra note 27, at 1–2 (offering advantages and 
disadvantages to developments). 
 247. See id. at 1 (including financial benefits to the developer in a special 
district). 
 248. See id. (noting that debts are not incurred by a developer, but by the 
district). 
 249. See id. (stating that a developer can recoup costs in ways other than 
just sale price). 
 250. See id. at 2 (offering as an advantage to a future owner the availability 
of amenities more quickly and at a lower cost than if the property were not in a 
special district). 
 251. See id. (stating that the sales price is favorable to a buyer because debts 
are not to be repaid solely from the sale of properties within the special district 
development). 
 252. See Griffith, supra note 31, at 960 (explaining that special districts can 
provide a means of necessary development in areas that could not afford these 
improvements otherwise). 
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nothing to the city, and they have the potential to turn into cash 
cows for new tax revenues.253 As discussed above, cities are being 
called upon to bring about an economic renaissance.254 With such 
a call to action, it is all too inevitable that the creation of 
development special districts will only continue to be embraced 
by local government decision makers. Local governments are 
hungry for new tax revenues to support services and necessities 
that residents demand. However, cities are seeing diminished tax 
revenues, and there is barely any support from state and federal 
partners, which was once so free-flowing.255 The development 
special district serves as an attractive solution to this problem 
because it can attract economic investment and grow the tax 
base.256 
Economic development investors shop around from locale to 
locale looking for the right site to land.257 Investors want to get 
the best deal possible and maximize their output, productivity, 
and profitability.258 This is particularly true of real estate 
developers.259 Location is immensely important, but when 
multiple acceptable sites are identified, concerns turn to how 
these developments will be financed.260 Infrastructure costs only 
continue to rise, and conventional lending can limit the extent of 
a developer’s ability to realize his vision for the project.261 Lavish 
                                                                                                     
 253. See id. at 961 (explaining that a major motivation to develop special 
districts is the ability to make necessary infrastructure updates without 
necessarily increasing taxes). 
 254. See supra Part II (discussing the current economic climate in cities 
nationwide). 
 255. See generally supra Part II. 
 256. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 220 (introducing the benefits to a 
successful development, including raised revenues and a larger tax base). 
 257. See Griffith, supra note 31, at 975 (discussing the need for local 
governments to attract developers). 
 258. See generally JOHN P. WIEDEMER, JOSEPH E. GOETERS & J. EDWARD 
GRAHAM, REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT (2010). 
 259. See id. at 13 (noting that land developers look at the location before 
making an investment). 
 260. See id. at 1 (introducing the idea that financing real estate development 
is often an issue). 
 261. See id. 191–94 (providing an overview of cost financing in real estate 
investment). 
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chateau-style clubhouses, sweeping golf courses, and crystal-blue 
swimming pools come at a high cost that can often involve 
speculative financing. Conventional lenders tend to be risk-averse 
and are more likely to reign in the whimsical aspirations of the 
developer.262 
But the development special district hurdles over all these 
obstacles.263 The developer need not borrow any money at all, and 
no conventional lender need be involved.264 A well-connected 
developer with political clout and an attractive-sounding 
development can easily convince an economic development-
hungry city council or county commission to authorize the 
creation of a special taxing district.265 And, in fact, the local 
government may take the offensive itself and affirmatively offer 
the carrot of a special district to the developer shopping around 
his project to various locales.266 While the city cannot promise to 
actually build the infrastructure from its own general fund, it can 
certainly create a legal framework whereby the developer can 
accomplish the same goal through other means—the development 
special district can do the trick.267 The tax exemption for interest 
on municipal and district bonds is key here.268 Conventional 
lenders pay tax on the interest they receive, but holders of 
municipal bonds do not.269 Therefore, the cost of capital for any 
developer will be lower to the extent he can bypass conventional 
lenders and borrow from bondholders who are subsidized by their 
                                                                                                     
 262. See generally JOHN P. WIEDEMER & KEITH J. BAKER, REAL ESTATE 
FINANCE (2012); OLIVER R. SIMS & FRANKLIN B. FIELDS, COMMERCIAL REAL 
ESTATE LENDING: RISK MITIGATION AND BANK SUPERVISION (2013). 
 263. See supra Part III.B (noting that special district developments have 
thrived). 
 264. See generally supra Part III.B.  
 265. See generally supra Part III.B.  
 266. See supra Part II (noting that local governments benefit from special 
districts because they finance infrastructure development that the local 
government often cannot fund on its own). 
 267. See supra Parts II–III (explaining the process involved in developing a 
special district). 
 268. See Griffith, supra note 31, at 939 (discussing methods of financing 
special district development). 
 269. See id. at 970 (explaining the interest exemption for municipal bonds). 
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income-tax deduction.270 Development special districts were 
widely used prior to the Great Recession.271 Many developments, 
ranging from the Deep South to the West Coast and up the 
eastern seaboard, utilized these quasi-public, quasi-private 
entities to achieve the goals of real estate developers without 
hamstringing the public purse.272 But in the age of cities where 
the prevailing view is that local governments pose the best 
chance for economic recovery, the drive to use a variety of public 
tools and incentives has the potential to result in the creation of 
many more development special districts under the mantle of 
economic development.273 After all, the city will inevitably reap 
the manifold economic benefits that result from the successes of 
developments like Beau Chateaux.274 Development special 
districts serve as a great low-cost financing tool for the 
developer.275 The infrastructure and improvement expenses of the 
project, although derived from a form of property taxation, cost 
the city nothing at all.276 Or do they? 
IV. Understanding the Unintended Consequences 
Despite all the accolades surrounding development special 
districts and their ability to have a positive effect on the local 
                                                                                                     
 270. See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3060 (discussing how developers can 
lower costs by financing with municipal bonds). 
 271. See Shoked, supra note 90, at 1986 (discussing the widespread use of 
special districts). 
 272. See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3044 (discussing MUDs in Texas); 
Griffith, supra note 31, at 960–74 (discussing Florida’s community development 
districts, Georgia’s infrastructure development districts, Colorado’s public 
improvement districts, Delaware’s special development districts, and New 
Mexico’s public improvement districts); Miller, supra note 119, at 148–49 
(discussing public facilities districts in California). 
 273. See Shoked, supra note 90, at 2000 (discussing the benefits of 
developing special districts). 
 274. See Griffith, supra note 31, at 961 (explaining that cities are motivated 
to develop special districts). 
 275. See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3061 (discussing the low costs for 
private developers of special districts). 
 276. See supra Part III.B (explaining the benefits to financing 
infrastructures by developing special districts). 
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economy, little attention has been paid to some of the harsh, 
unjust, and far-reaching negative consequences that result from 
their use in terms of mortgage rights, real estate lending, and 
market equity.277 While true that they do not cost the city 
anything directly and that, if successful, they have the potential 
to increase tax revenues, other considerations that underlie their 
creation are often ignored.278 And with local government leaders 
continuing to use development special districts to achieve their 
economic development goals, these negative consequences are 
even more likely to be ignored.279  
A. Undermining Vested Property Rights 
The first negative consequence brought about by 
development special districts has to do with the way in which the 
corporation is able to enforce the payment of its special property 
tax assessments.280 As discussed above, if an individual parcel 
owner refuses or fails to timely pay his assessment, the district is 
automatically granted a statutory lien against that property in 
proportion to the amount of the assessment,281 which the district 
can then foreclose upon. 
                                                                                                     
 277. See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3068 (introducing some negative 
consequences to the increased development of special districts); Griffith, supra 
note 31, at 972 (discussing the consequences of using special districts); Miller, 
supra note 119, at 153 (discussing racial and ethnic segregation as negative 
consequences of special districting); Shoked, supra note 90, at 2002 (introducing 
some costs of developing through special districts). 
 278. See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3053 (discussing the lack of democratic 
participation involved with special district development). 
 279. See Ritchie, supra note 22 (discussing the impacts of the financing of a 
special district development, which left residents with a great deal of bond debt); 
Watson, supra note 102, at 220 (introducing the notion of competitive local 
governments, which might motivate cities to use special districting to effect 
development); White, supra note 8 (providing examples of failed special taxing 
districts). 
 280. See generally Callies, supra note 27. 
 281. See id. at 786 (“To those owners who refuse to pay, the association can 
place a property lien against their parcel and thereby cause issues of non-
merchantable title, violations of existing loan agreements, and a weakening of 
the parcel’s commercial viability.”). 
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1. Special District Liens Compared to Common Interest 
Community Liens 
At first blush, this is no different than the statutory liens 
that are accorded to homeowners’ associations, condominium 
associations, and every other type of common interest ownership 
regime across the country when an owner fails to pay his 
association dues.282 The ability to impose a lien on the property 
serves as one of the coercive functions that allow common interest 
ownership communities to control externalities.283 Without the 
ability to punish noncompliant homeowners, the neighborhood 
association would be without the ability to create positive 
externalities and to ward off negative ones.284 The entire 
common-interest-community scheme would be rendered merely 
voluntary and, therefore, lose much of its allure and 
effectiveness.285 Furthermore, many homeowners’ association 
statutes, condominium association statutes, and similar legal 
frameworks limit the extent to which the association can impose 
dues.286 This, in turn, helps keep the enforcement mechanism in 
                                                                                                     
 282. See EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE 
RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 140 (1994) (comparing homeowners’ 
associations to private governments); Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group 
Autonomy: Residential Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 23 
(1989) (discussing traditional payment mechanisms in place in residential 
communities); Frank Michelman, Universal Resident Suffrage: A Liberal 
Defense, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (1982) (introducing the power structure 
in place in most resident communities).  
 283. See Wayne S. Hyatt, Common Interest Communities: Evolution and 
Reinvention, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 303, 305 (1998) (introducing the “social 
infrastructure” found in community developments); Stahl, supra note 115, at 
947 (discussing the ability to control externalities within neighborhoods). 
 284. See Shirley L. Mays, Privatization of Municipal Services: A Contagion 
in the Body Politic, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 41, 57 (1995) (discussing the mechanism 
through which these neighborhoods can exert control over residents); Stahl, 
supra note 115, at 977 (explaining why residents have an interest in controlling 
the properties within the development). 
 285. See Susan F. French, Making Common Interest Communities Work: The 
Next Step, 37 URB. LAW. 359, 362 (2005) (exploring differences between 
neighborhoods with voluntary and with mandatory membership). 
 286. See SETHA LOW, BEHIND THE GATES: LIFE, SECURITY, AND THE PURSUIT OF 
HAPPINESS IN FORTRESS AMERICA 173–95 (2003) (providing an insider account of 
life in gated communities); Todd Brower, Communities Within the Community: 
Consent, Constitutionalism, and Other Failures of Legal Theory in Residential 
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check so as to ensure that individual financial obligations do not 
become overly burdensome.287 
However, what makes the development special district 
different is that it is a public body and the law gives the liens 
that are imposed in connection with its assessments superpriority 
(the same status as ad valorem property tax liens).288 Property 
tax liens enjoy superpriority such that they generally prime all 
pre-existing liens on the property.289 General common interest 
community liens do not enjoy the superpriority.290 Although some 
states allow for HOA liens to be given some form of preferred 
priority, it is always only for a certain limited period of time and 
only for a certain amount—typically fairly nominal compared to 
the unbounded amounts that be imposed through the special 
district lien.291 
2. The Superpriority of Ad Valorem Property Tax Liens 
The fact that general ad valorem property tax liens are given 
superpriority status is not unusual.292 In fact, this has long been 
the rule because the government has a substantial interest in 
ensuring the timely and efficient collection of property taxes.293 
                                                                                                     
Associations, 7 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 203, 229 (1992) (discussing statutory 
limitations on homeowners’ associations). 
 287. See generally LOW, supra note 286 (discussing real-life accounts of 
residents in gated communities). 
 288. See Callies, supra note 27, at 2 (discussing the consequences of 
government-assisted private development). 
 289. See id. (discussing the financial consequences of private developments 
aided by public government). 
 290. See Paula Franzese, Privatization and Its Discontents: Common-
Interest Communities and the Rise of Government for “the Nice,” 37 URB. LAW. 
335, 348 (2005) (discussing the stringent payment requirements in place in 
some housing communities); French, supra note 285, at 363 (discussing 
similarities between communities associations, cities, and corporations). 
 291. See Miller, supra note 119, at 131 (noting the use of HOAs in 
California); Stahl, supra note 115, at 990 (discussing the impact of liens on 
property owners). 
 292. See Shu-Yi Oei, The Uneasy Case for Tax Lien Subordination, 11 PITT. 
TAX REV. 241, 248–56 (2014) (introducing the current tax lien priority scheme). 
 293. See Thomas Bonura, Misdirected Hostility: Are Criticisms of Texas 
Property Tax Lenders Justified?, 53 S. TEX. L. REV. 569, 570 (2012) (“With the 
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Revenues from these taxes go toward supporting an array of 
important public necessities—everything from roads and bridges 
to schools and hospitals.294 So, although granting the general 
property tax lien a priority over pre-existing liens is an exception 
to the law’s usual first-in-time priority rule, the exception is 
justified because of the compelling societal benefit that is 
achieved by giving them the first position.295  
Because the residents of the municipality rely upon the 
general collection of property taxes in order to fund services and 
public goods that are needed by the entire populace, it is 
reasonable, and in fact necessary, that the liens that arise in 
connection with their enforcement are given special treatment.296 
And the market has easily accommodated this framework.297 
When individuals take out a residential loan secured by a 
mortgage, the bank builds into the monthly payments an amount 
sufficient to take care of the annual property tax bill because the 
lender anticipates that the property tax lien will, by law, prime 
the mortgage.298 
                                                                                                     
growing demand for these lien purchases and the growing desire of local 
governing entities to develop and facilitate an industry that maximizes revenue 
collection, it is no surprise that the volumes of tax lien transactions have risen 
at a corresponding rate.”). 
 294. See generally GLENN W. FISHER, THE WORST TAX?: A HISTORY OF THE 
PROPERTY TAX IN AMERICA (1996). 
 295. See id. at 7 (noting that property taxes are justified by the benefits 
resulting from the revenues raised); Frank Alexander, Tax Liens, Tax Sales, and 
Due Process, 75 IND. L.J. 747, 802 (2000) (discussing the increase in revenue 
that can result from certain tax liens). 
 296. See Alexander, supra note 295, at 806 (noting the special nature of 
enforcing payment of property taxes). 
 297. See id. (discussing the shift that has occurred to accommodate a need 
for changing property tax enforcement). 
 298. See generally Richard J. Andreano, Jr., Stanley D. Mabbitt, John D. 
Socknat & Michael S. Waldron, CFPB Adopts Mortgage Escrow Account Final 
Rule, 67 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 53 (2013). 
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3. The Deprivation of Property Rights Without Just Compensation 
However, the liens that arise in connection with development 
special districts are quite different.299 The developer, who initially 
owns all the land in the development, has the ability to indirectly 
appoint his people to the district board and thus is the one who, 
practically speaking, controls the amount of assessments that 
will be charged against each of the lots.300 Therefore, he has 
control over not only the amount of the liens but also over their 
enforcement, including in preference to his real estate lender.301  
Going back to the example in the introduction above, the 
developer initially obtained a loan from Realty Bank so he could 
purchase the land and have some capital for the initial build out. 
The bank had its mortgage recorded as a first lien on the 
property. Then, a few months later, the developer had the local 
government grant him a special taxing district as part of their 
incentive package to entice him to come and develop in the area. 
The petition and the governing documents for the district were 
drawn up by the developer’s attorneys. Once approved, the 
developer swiftly had the board appointed composed of all his 
friends and supporters and began the process of having his 
attorneys and financial advisors generate the bond documents.  
Spurred on by local government politicians eager for his 
success and buttressed by his own visions of the ultimate real 
estate community, the developer had the board issue a massive 
bond issuance to pay for the many luxuries and improvements he 
intends for Beau Chateaux. Realty Bank monitors these events in 
horror, understanding that the liens (which will be substantial) 
arising from this bond issuance will prime their pre-existing 
mortgage, but the bank is unable to do anything to stop it. As 
long as the developer is timely in making the debt service on 
Realty Bank’s loan, there is nothing to legally be done. 
                                                                                                     
 299. See Callies, supra note 27, at 1 (introducing the distinct nature of 
financing special districts). 
 300. See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3051–54 (discussing developer control 
over special districts, especially in the early stages). 
 301.  See id. at 3049 (noting the ability of most developers to choose a 
financial institution). 
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But when Beau Chateaux fails and the district goes into 
default on its bonds because of a massive failure to pay the 
special assessments, the bondholders move to force the district to 
foreclose on its liens and have the properties seized and sold.302 
At the same time, the developer defaults on his loan to Realty 
Bank. Realty Bank now moves to exercise its mortgage rights to 
foreclosure on the property and to have it seized and sold.303 
Technically Realty Bank’s mortgage was given first position due 
to the normal recording acts system. However, because the 
special district’s liens are given the same priority as general ad 
valorem property tax liens, the Beau Chateaux district’s right 
will enjoy superpriority. Realty Bank’s interest will be 
subordinated, regardless of the fact that its rights arose first and 
that without its initial capital, the development would not have 
even been possible.304  
Importantly, the subordination of Realty Bank’s lien 
represents the taking of a private property interest by the 
government.305 However, as discussed above, no just 
compensation is due because of the theory that property tax liens 
serve a broader societal good.306 But is that really true? The 
general property tax lien surely serves such a purpose.307 
Everyone within the jurisdiction enjoys the benefits conferred by 
general-purpose property taxes—they can all use the schools, the 
sewer system, the fire and policy services, and the water 
distribution networks.308 But this is not the case with the 
                                                                                                     
 302. See White, supra note 8 (discussing a decline in quality of life in an 
abandoned special district development). 
 303. See generally Ritchie, supra note 22. 
 304. See Bonura, supra note 293, at 579 (noting that the interests of 
creditors may be subordinated). 
 305. See Alexander, supra note 282, at 792 (framing the issue of 
subordination as a possible taking). 
 306. See id. at 748 (introducing the nature of the property tax); FISHER, 
supra note 294, at 6 (noting that people would resist paying taxes more 
strenuously if they did not receive some benefit from the revenues). 
 307. See FISHER, supra note 294, at 6 (discussing how support for a property 
tax is traced to the idea that the people are benefitted in some way). 
 308. See id. at 187–205 (discussing the current property tax regime and the 
way in which revenues are spent). 
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development special district.309 The benefits conferred by these 
property taxes are not widespread or shared in the least.310 
Rather, the goods and services that arise from these assessments 
are solely enjoyed by a discrete group of individuals in a purely 
private development.311 
It is a foundation of constitutional jurisprudence that one 
cannot be deprived of one’s property interest without being 
accorded just compensation in relation to the value of what was 
taken.312 When the government exercises its power of eminent 
domain to take one’s land for a public park or to obtain an 
easement for utilities or a right of way for a road, the private 
landowner is compensated.313 Those who possess security rights 
in property, such as the mortgage lien given to Realty Bank, also 
have vested property rights that are given constitutional 
protections.314 The only reason the ad valorem property tax lien’s 
superpriority does not require just compensation is because of the 
very broad and compelling government interest that is served by 
giving it such a status.315  
                                                                                                     
 309. See Miller, supra note 119, at 155–57 (discussing the fact that often the 
benefits provided by a special district are limited to that specific neighborhood). 
 310. See Griffith, supra note 31, at 974 (noting that the benefits affect a 
limited number of area residents). 
 311. See id. at 962 (discussing how special districts are created to 
accommodate small groups of residents who want the same services). 
 312. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 
469, 477 (2005) (explaining what results when a government takes property 
without compensating the owner). 
 313. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 
1106 (1972) (discussing eminent domain); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The 
Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2181 (1997) (discussing the state’s option to use 
private land for public purposes). 
 314. See Priya S. Gupta, The American Dream, Deferred: Contextualizing 
Property After the Foreclosure Crisis, 73 MD. L. REV. 523, 556 (2014) (noting that 
banks often hold security interests in people’s homes); Michael S. Moskowitz, 
Treading Water: Can Municipal Efforts to Condemn Underwater Mortgages 
Prevail?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 633, 647 (2014) (protecting security rights). 
 315. See Alexander, supra note 295, at 770–71 (discussing the superpriority 
status of property tax liens). 
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But this rationale is entirely absent from the super status 
given to development special liens.316 They serve only to enrich a 
very narrow, limited, and private interest—namely, to fund the 
services and amenities of a private real estate development.317 It 
makes no sense to effectively render the rights of third parties 
like Realty Bank valueless in the name of paying for a golf 
course, a community pool, and other private luxuries for Claire, 
Henry, and their fellow residents in Beau Chateaux. However, 
that is exactly what the development special district lien 
allows.318  
B. Destabilizing Conventional Real Estate Lending 
Another unintended consequence that results from the 
spread of development special districts has to do with their 
impact on the conventional lending market.319 The way in which 
special districts fund their improvements and operations serves 
in many ways as a sort of private bank for the developer.320 He 
gets free capital at low costs from a source that he practically 
controls.321 In exchange, he need not sign any personal 
guarantees or promissory notes, and if the project fails, the 
obligations are non-recourse to him.322 
It may seem that this scenario operates independently of 
other facts and that the unjustness of this situation is more 
policy-oriented. If a given municipality chooses to bestow such 
benefits on a developer, then why should it not be free to do so? 
                                                                                                     
 316. See Callies, supra note 27, at 2 (discussing the reasons for prioritizing 
property tax liens). 
 317. See Stahl, supra note 115, at 941 (introducing the idea that only a small 
group benefits from the liens in special districts). 
 318. See id. at 990 (discussing the practical effect of a lien). 
 319. See Saft, supra note 32 (providing an overview of financial 
transactions). 
 320. See Briffault, supra note 85, at 514 (discussing the initial funding for 
special district development). 
 321. See id. at 522 (explaining one way that developers see their projects 
financed). 
 322. See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3048 (noting that the development 
projects are low or no cost to the developer). 
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However, as discussed above, other creditors with vested property 
interests in the form of liens are subordinated to the special 
district’s interest.323 And this subordination, as discussed below, 
has a serious impact on the conventional real estate lending 
market as a whole.324 
1. Impact on the Primary Mortgage Market—Community Lending 
Impacts 
In the traditional scenario, lenders assess their risk and 
make a determination on how much and under what conditions 
they will lend for a real estate project based on the economic and 
financial projections of the undertaking, the creditworthiness of 
the borrower, and the value of available collateral to secure the 
repayment obligation.325 The lender will advance funds if and 
only if it believes sufficient property has been posted as security 
for the loan.326  
In the event that the borrower, despite reasonable revenue 
projections and a clean credit history, defaults under the loan, the 
lender can foreclose upon the collateral, have it seized and sold in 
accordance with law, and apply the proceeds from the sale to the 
remainder of the debt.327 However, the value of the security in the 
collateral is premised on the idea that the lender has a first 
position lien on the property.328 If another creditor has a superior 
position, then the property will be seized and sold and the 
proceeds applied in preference to the higher ranked creditor 
                                                                                                     
 323. See Callies, supra note 27, at 2 (discussing the priority given to certain 
property tax liens); Larson, supra note 40, at 605 (noting that private lenders’ 
interests are subordinated to municipal lenders). 
 324. See Cox, supra note 23, at 104 (discussing the impact of subordination 
on home financing). 
 325. See Saft, supra note 32 (providing an overview of the lending process). 
 326. See generally GRANT S. NELSON ET AL., REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, 
AND DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS (8th ed. 2009). 
 327. See id. at 49 (offering a scenario in which a lender might advance 
funds). 
 328. See id. at 94 (discussing the impact of priority position on lenders’ 
perception). 
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before the lender is repaid.329 And, if the foreclosure sale does not 
draw a high enough bid (as is often the case), then the inferior-
positioned lender may end up with nothing at all.330 
Because real estate lenders cannot know at the time of 
making the loan whether a development special district will be 
created and thereby prime their security rights, lenders will 
eventually begin tightening credit in real estate development 
lending generally.331 This is particularly true with regard to the 
use of development special districts for purposes that truly are for 
a broader societal benefit.332 For instance, some municipalities 
have not completely handed over the development special district 
device to private developers; rather, some have used them to 
partner with private developers to build in areas where 
conventional financing is not available.333 Such blighted and 
economically depressed areas are unable to attract private 
investment at the level that would be needed to truly improve 
                                                                                                     
 329. See generally SIMS & FIELDS, supra note 262.  
 330. See id. at 555 (giving a hypothetical example of a foreclosure sale). 
 331. For more information on this topic, see generally Larson, supra note 40 
and the accompanying discussion of the PACE issue’s effect on real estate 
lending. 
 332. See, e.g., Acquisition for Spot Blight Removal, HUD, 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/comm_planning/com
munitydevelopment/rulesandregs/memoranda/acqspot89 (last visited Mar. 30, 
2015) (discussing the national effort to improve neighborhoods) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review)  
 333. See, e.g., Keila Szpaller, Missoula Aggressively Uses Urban Renewal 
Districts, MISSOULIAN (June 26, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://missoulian.com/news/ 
local/missoula-aggressively-uses-urban-renewal-districts-councilman-stresses-
blight-not/article_e80f4ae2-8629-11e3-88ec-0019bb2963f4.html (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2015) (discussing the use of urban renewal districts to improve 
neighborhoods in Missoula, Montana) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Bill Varian, Hillsborough Looks at Focusing Taxes to Fight Blight, 
TAMPA BAY TIMES (Mar. 10, 2013, 5:30 AM), http://www.tampabay. 
com/news/localgovernment/hillsborough-looks-at-focusing-taxes-to-fight-blight/ 
210 8177 (last updated Mar. 11, 2013, 12:55 AM) (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) 
(looking at new taxes to address blight in Florida) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Sarah Westwood, Blight, Be Gone: BoC Plans to Form 
Authority to Tackle Issues in South Cobb, MARIETTA DAILY J. (June 15, 2014, 
4:00 AM), http://www.mdjonline.com/view/full_story/25293725/article-Blight--be-
gone--BoC-plans-to-form-authority-to-tackle-issues-in-south-Cobb (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2015) (discussing plans to address blight in Georgia) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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that community.334 However, the city—through the granting of a 
development special district—a willing affordable housing 
developer, and a community-minded bank might be able to 
partner and bridge the financing gap to reinvigorate whole 
neighborhoods that have traditionally been cut off from the 
financing market.335 
But as development special districts continue to serve as 
piggy banks for private developers to construct lavish 
subdivisions such as the likes of Beau Chateaux, conventional 
lenders—however community-minded they may be—will be 
hesitant to lend in any project that might involve a development 
special district.336 In other words, the use of development special 
districts in such an aggressive and unrestrained way by purely 
private developers dirties the water for the use of these special 
districts for truly altruistic and worthy purposes.337 Banks and 
other lenders will shy away from advancing the “first-in” capital 
or the bridge financing because of the fear that the special district 
bond issuance will not be closely regulated or limited in scope in 
accordance with a conservative and realistic projection of the 
performance of the project.338  
2. Impact on the Secondary Mortgage Market—Comparison to 
PACE 
The impact of development special districts is not only 
relevant to the primary mortgage market where loans are 
                                                                                                     
 334. See Varian, supra note 333 (explaining plans in place that aim to 
attract private investors to the region); Westwood, supra note 333 (discussing 
the impact of “years of neglect” and the plans for future improvements). 
 335. See Szpaller, supra note 333 (explaining plans to use special districts to 
finance improvements to the region). 
 336. See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3048 (describing the mechanics of 
financing a special district development). See generally Callies, supra note 27 
(discussing the unique financing of special districts). 
 337. See Griffith, supra note 31, at 963 (discussing the use of special 
districts to control where revenues are spent). 
 338. See Larson, supra note 40, at 620 (discussing the fear of lenders that 
borrowers will exceed their own ability to pay). 
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initially made.339 Rather, the potential to have a significant 
impact on the secondary mortgage market is where development 
special districts can cause the real injury. Many property 
lawyers, policymakers, and sustainability advocates will 
remember the issues surrounding the Property Assessed Clean 
Energy (PACE) program.  
PACE was initially known as the “Berkeley First Program” 
where a local business called Renewable Funding created a 
structure for financing residential solar energy systems and other 
energy efficiency improvements by partnering with local 
governments.340 The expenses related to these improvements for 
individual homes were built into the homeowner’s annual 
property tax bill.341 The idea came from a dilemma whereby 
homeowners would spend many thousands of dollars installing 
energy efficient improvements in their homes, but would not 
necessarily see the cost of these improvements translate into an 
increase in their home’s value.342 Homeowners never totally 
recouped their losses upon the sale of the homes.343 And even 
when homeowners were able to get bank financing for these 
improvements, individuals rarely wanted to borrow the money 
due to their being compelled to continue making loan payments 
even after the property had been sold to a new owner.344 To 
address these issues, PACE was born.345 
PACE relies upon special property tax assessments to 
finance the energy improvements on the properties within the 
                                                                                                     
 339. See id. at 620 (explaining which financing tools are most in demand in 
mortgage markets). 
 340. See Berkley First, OFF. ENERGY & SUSTAINABLE DEV. FOR CITY OF 
BERKLEY, http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/ContentDisplay.aspx?id=26580 (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2015) (describing a financing program in the City of Berkley) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 341. Id. 
 342. See Cox, supra note 23, at 104 (noting that improvements do not always 
increase a home’s value). 
 343. See About PACE, PACENOW.ORG, http://pacenow.org/blog/about-pace 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (describing the PACE program as an effective 
financing tool that saves homeowners money) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 344. See id. (discussing the benefits of PACE financing). 
 345. See id. (describing the challenge that PACE seeks to solve). 
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PACE district.346 The setup sounds familiar. Generally, the 
municipality would create a special taxing district for a certain 
area of the locality.347 Bonds would then be issued and would be 
repaid by the future special property tax assessments over 
time.348 As with development special districts discussed above, 
the lengthy term for repayment (usually twenty years) allowed 
individuals to enjoy the energy savings from the improvements, 
but only required participants to pay a nominal amount each 
year.349 Municipalities loved it too because the increased 
efficiency of utilities was good for the pocketbooks of the general 
populace,350 and the need for more sustainable providers and 
software technicians created economic overflow and, thus, more 
tax revenue.351 The plan sounded perfect. 
                                                                                                     
 346. See Joel B. Eisen, Can Urban Solar Become a “Disruptive Technology?”: 
The Case for Solar Utilities, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 53, 84 
(2010) (“Project funding comes from special tax bonds repaid through taxes 
collected on the property tax bills of participating owners. California pioneered 
this approach, and as of 2010, eighteen states had laws that allow their counties 
and cities to establish special assessment districts for energy financing.”). 
 347. See HANNAH MULLER & SARAH TRUITT, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SOLAR 
POWERING YOUR COMMUNITY: A GUIDE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 35 (July 2009) 
(discussing the way special districts are set up to finance clean energy); Annie 
Carmichael, Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) Enabling Legislation, VOTE 
SOLAR (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.pacenow.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2012/07/PACE_enablinglegislation-3.18.10.pdf (explaining that local 
governments set up special districts to finance clean energy). 
 348. See Erin Elizabeth Burg Hupp, Refining Green Building Regulations 
and Funding Green Buildings in Order to Achieve Greenhouse Gas Reductions, 
42 URB. LAW. 639, 645–46 (2010) (“These costs are repaid to the city over twenty 
years through a special tax on the property.”). 
 349. See JASON COUGHLIN, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY, 
PHOTOVOLTAICS (PV) AS AN ELIGIBLE MEASURE IN RESIDENTIAL PACE PROGRAMS: 
BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES 2 (June 2010) (discussing the financial benefits to 
homeowners who opt into programs such as PACE). 
 350. See Kate Galbraith, Can a National Energy-Efficiency Program Work in 
Texas?, TEX. TRIB. (July 19, 2010), http://www.texastribune.org/2010/07/19/can-
a-national-energy-efficiency-program-work-in-t/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) 
(providing an overview of arguments for and against participation in PACE 
programs) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 351. See Eric Jamison, Property Assessed Clean Energy—A Bright Spot in 
Michigan’s Economic and Environmental Future, GREAT LAKES LAW (Sept. 10, 
2009), http://www.greatlakeslaw.org/blog/2009/09/property-assessed-clean-ener 
gy--a-bright-spot-in-michigans-economic-and-environmental-future.html (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2015) (discussing the enactment of PACE legislation in 
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But alas, it was not to be. The PACE special district liens 
were also given superpriority on par with ad valorem real 
property taxes, as is accorded to all special taxing district liens, 
including development special districts.352 Thus, homeowners who 
utilized the PACE program to finance their infrastructure 
enabled a lien to attach to their property to secure repayment of 
the bonds.353 This lien, as with development special districts, had 
the effect of priming the pre-existing lien rights of the 
homeowner’s mortgage lender.354 As a response, in July of 2010, 
the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) stated that Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac would stop purchasing mortgages on the 
secondary market if the collateral was within a PACE district, 
even if the homeowner was not a participant in the program.355 
The result of this action was to effectively kill all PACE activity 
across the U.S.356 For fear of having a negative impact on 
residential financing within their municipalities, local 
governments stopped creating PACE districts altogether.357 And, 
as might be imagined, lenders who could not count on selling 
                                                                                                     
Michigan) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 352. See Larson, supra note 40, at 609 (“Any such assessment constitutes a 
lien on the property and is collected ‘in the same manner and with the same 
priority as ad valorem real property taxes.’” (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 67.2815.5 
(2010))). 
 353. See id. at 600 (“Under such a program, the cost of qualified energy 
improvements is added as an assessment tax to the owner’s yearly property tax 
bill, with the obligation to pay being secured by a lien on the encumbered 
property.”). 
 354. See id. at 610–13 (discussing the concerns of major mortgage lenders 
about the lien prioritization of PACE liens). 
 355. Bulletin from Freddie Mac to Freddie Mac Sellers and Servicers 1 (Aug. 
31, 2010), http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/guide/bulletins/pdf/bll 
1020.pdf (discussing changes to the mortgaging policy regarding homes within 
PACE districts).  
 356. See Todd Woody, Homeowners Must Pay Off Energy Improvement 
Loans, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2010), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010 
/08/31/homeowners-must-pay-off-energy-improvement-loans/?_r=0 (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2015) (discussing the halt of the PACE program as a result of an 
unresolved dispute with major mortgage lenders) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 357. See Wilson et al., supra note 39, at 281–88 (discussing the goal of PACE 
programs and the debate surrounding them). 
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their mortgage loans on the secondary market had no interest in 
making residential loans in PACE district-related areas.358 
PACE special districts have exactly the same rights and 
powers as development special districts.359 And, in fact, the 
development special districts pose a much greater threat because 
they are allowed to finance a wide array of improvements far 
beyond solar panels, rain retention basins, and the like.360 As a 
result, their bond issuances can be much larger and can produce 
a far more substantial lien than what would normally be 
spawned by a PACE district.361 
As local governments continue to embrace development 
special districts in their efforts to meet the growing expectation 
that they lead the way in terms of economic recovery, it is 
inevitable that eventually the secondary market as a whole—
particularly the government-sponsored entities—will step in and 
put a stop to the use of development special districts altogether in 
the same fashion as was done with PACE.362 And this too 
produces a societal ill because it further erodes the legitimate use 
of development special districts in connection with bettering truly 
deserving projects in economically depressed areas.363 
C. Clothing Private Interests with Public Powers 
Last but not least, the development special district give-away 
has a substantial negative effect on fundamental market 
fairness.364 Vying for economic development projects is 
                                                                                                     
 358. See id. at 39–40 (discussing the impact of the PACE program on 
mortgage lenders). 
 359. See generally Wrapp, supra note 24 (discussing the various ways 
different districts can be used to finance projects). 
 360. See Callies, supra note 27, at 326 (noting the amenities financed 
through private district developments); Wilson et al., supra note 39, at 276–78 
(discussing the various uses for PACE funding). 
 361. See Larson, supra note 40 at 601–03 (explaining the mechanics of a 
PACE lien). 
 362. See id. at 612 (discussing the way the PACE program was essentially 
brought to a halt). 
 363. See id. at 618 (noting the community benefits of the PACE program). 
 364. See Odinet, supra note 232, at 825–32 (critiquing the current system for 
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undoubtedly a part of municipal competition.365 This has been so 
prior to the Great Recession and continues to be so even more 
today.366 As a part of this process, cities and local governments 
package together various incentive plans—sometimes tax breaks, 
sometimes direct grants, and even sometimes special taxing 
districts—all in an effort to lure in the ultimate prize.367 
Presenting the best carrot in terms of the investors or businesses 
getting the biggest bang for their buck is how economic 
development battles between municipalities are ultimately 
won.368 
1. The Profits and Problems of Public-Private Partnerships 
The coupling of a development special district with the 
efforts and capital of a private real estate developer are often 
described as a form of public–private partnership.369 Under this 
scheme, the city subsidizes private development in the hopes of a 
public return.370 Such arrangements have long occurred and have 
                                                                                                     
its unfairness). 
 365. See id. at 793 (discussing the effect of competition on the finance 
market). 
 366. See Watson, supra note 102, at 220 (“As the economy begins to rebound 
from the Great Recession, competition between cities has become palpable in 
recent years.”); Casella, supra note 54 (discussing the trend of development 
outside of major cities); Parisella, supra note 54 (discussing the importance of 
major cities). 
 367. See Watson, supra note 102, at 7 (“[L]ocal governments enter the 
market as sellers competing against other localities for development. . . . The 
local government is selling its quality of life, its location, its available sites, its 
workforce, and various incentives in the same way that a private company sells 
its products to consumers.”). 
 368. See Odinet supra note 5, at 220 (“Cities often compete with one another 
to lure this economic development projects by each offering their own package of 
public incentives for the private business or developer to consider.”). 
 369. See Callies, supra note 27, at 21 (“Virtually every state authorizes tax 
increment financing in some form, almost exclusively for redevelopment 
projects.”). 
 370. See id. at 20 (“Tax increment financing . . . is ‘free money’ used to pay 
for the redevelopment and then returned to its rightful place as part of a now-
enhanced stream of revenue to the governmental bodies which levy such taxes 
on the property in the first place.”).  
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often carried a heavy price tag. In 2004, the City of New York 
meted out $100 million in public incentives to prevent Goldman 
Sachs from moving its headquarters to neighboring New 
Jersey.371 And after the 2008 financial crisis, New York City, 
eager to keep its venture capital population firmly in place, 
handed out $45 million in seed money to private sector 
projects.372 
But these public–private partnerships, despite being widely 
lauded even by the likes of President Obama, rarely turn out as 
rosy as they are initially envisioned.373 They necessarily involve 
giving preference to one private entity over another.374 Instead of 
forcing the private party to weather the risk associated with its 
for-profit ventures, and thereby having skin in the game to 
temper its expectations, the public subsidy largely frees them 
from such considerations.375 With the development special 
                                                                                                     
 371. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 236 (“For instance, in 2004 the city of New 
York allocated $100 million worth of public incentives to Goldman Sachs when 
the company threatened to move its headquarters to New Jersey.” (citing David 
W. Chen, Much Vilified, Financial Titans Find a Friend in Bloomberg, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2009, at A17)). 
 372. See id. (“Similarly, after the 2008 crash and in the face of the 
threatened departure of many venture capitalists from the city, the local 
government offered to invest roughly $45 million in seed capital to private sector 
enterprises in order to entice them to remain.” (citing David W. Chen, 
Economists’ Forecast: Chance of Change 100%, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2009, at 
A17)). 
 373. See Colleen Curtis, In Miami, President Obama Talks About His Plan 
to Put People to Work Rebuilding America, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Mar. 29, 2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/03/29/miami-president-obama-talks-about-
his-plan-put-people-work-rebuilding-america (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) 
(discussing President Obama’s plan for creating jobs in Miami via the Port of 
Miami Tunnel project) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Laura Barrett, 6 Reasons to be Wary of Public–Private Partnerships, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/laura-barrett/6-
reasons-to-be-wary-of-p_b_3023410.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (discussing 
various reasons to be wary of public–private partnerships like the one President 
Obama proposed in the Port of Miami Tunnel project) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 374. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 238 (“In essence, by clothing the private 
party with the trappings of governmental power, the playing field is necessarily 
rendered uneven such that other businesses and service providers cannot fairly 
compete.”). 
 375. See id. at 239 (“The self-interested nature of these management 
arrangements can lead to a disproportionate share of risk being allocated to the 
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district, instead of having to personally sign the promissory note 
or personally guarantee the loan, the developer is able to spread 
the risk of the development’s failure to the larger public.376 
Moreover, in these supposed partnerships involving 
development special districts, the private party always has the 
leg-up.377 The developer need not worry about control or oversight 
by the local government because he controls the district’s board, 
and there are rarely any administrative mechanisms in place for 
the city to supervise its activities.378 “The self-interested nature of 
these management arrangements lead[s] to a disproportionate 
share of risk being allocated to the private partner, rather than 
being evenly spread between the two.”379 
2. Winners, Losers, and the Uneven Playing Field 
The haze created around the local government decision-
making process when an economic development “win” is dangled 
before the eyes of decision makers usually leads municipalities 
into the open arms of the developer.380 Important considerations 
of fairness, equality in the marketplace, and a level playing field 
easily fall away when the threat of losing the “deal” to another 
locale is looming overhead.381  
                                                                                                     
public partner, rather than being more evenly spread between the two.”). 
 376. See Callies, supra note 27, at 23 (“Put simply, TIF creates funding by 
borrowing against future tax revenues that are expected to be generated by the 
redeveloped area.”); Galvan, supra note 114, at 3060 (“MUDs, like many special 
districts, can take on significant debt without complying with the debt 
limitations imposed on the state, counties, or municipalities.”). 
 377. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 237 (“[T]he hypnotic effect of garnering an 
economic development ‘win’ often leads local governments head-first into the 
open arms of private parties seeking development partnerships.”). 
 378. See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3052 (“Developers tend to exert 
tremendous influence over MUDs’ boards of directors . . . .”). 
 379. Odinet, supra note 5, at 239. 
 380. See id. at 237 (discussing how economic desperation can lead certain 
municipalities into vulnerable relationships with private businesses); Barrett, 
supra note 373 (discussing how “financial desperation” has contributed to six 
troubling trends in public-private partnerships).  
 381. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 237 (“The promise of new infrastructure, 
jobs, and ongoing future growth creates a haze around the local government 
decision-making process such that many valid considerations are often let go by 
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Inherent in all public–private partnerships is the idea that a 
private individual is being clothed with public powers and 
resources in order to aid him in being successful.382 However, the 
details and extent of the partnership are rarely well defined.383 
The relationship is typically sold as a shared endeavor whereby 
both parties incur some risk in return for some reward.384 
However, that is rarely the case.385 The extent to which the 
developer bears any risk at all is often unclear to the general 
public (and perhaps even to the local government decision 
makers) in the development special district context.386 It is the 
district that issues the bonds and is responsible for the debt 
service, not the developer.387  
Moreover, justified resentment builds in other developers 
and private actors in the marketplace who do not receive such 
favorable treatment.388 While other real estate investors must 
                                                                                                     
the wayside. One such important consideration is the role of fairness and 
competition.”). 
 382. See id. at 238 (discussing how governmental preference often leads to 
an imbalance in private business competition); Dominique Custos & John Reitz, 
Public–Private Partnerships, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 555, 558 (2010) (“While the 
public sector usually retains ownership in the facility or system, the private 
party will be given additional decision rights in determining how the project or 
task will be completed.”). 
 383. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 237 (“However, in truth, the exact nature 
of the ‘partnership’ is often not well defined. The extent to which both parties—
the public and the private—are on the hook for both capital investment and for 
incurring losses is often left vague and uncertain.”). 
 384. See id. (“By engaging in these endeavors, local governments, at least 
nominally, are able to share both the risks and the rewards of a successful 
project with the private partner.”). 
 385. See id. at 238 (“While clothed in the mantle of a shared endeavor where 
each party walks into the arrangement with eyes wide open, the end result of 
these arrangements are [sic] often quite different than what was anticipated.”).  
 386. See id. (“[T]here is very little opportunity for the public to engage in 
meaningful oversight and management of the public private partnership 
relationship.”). 
 387. See Callies, supra note 27, at 21 (“All states appear to permit the 
issuance of bonds as the principal method of financing a project through tax 
increment financing.”).  
 388. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 241 (“This creates a malaise throughout 
the municipality as private enterprise refuses to further invest within the city’s 
boundaries—either out of resentment or because they believe any such 
investment should be coupled with a public subsidy of their own.”). 
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obtain conventional financing or equity participation and incur 
accompanying risk, the development special district parties need 
not do so.389 And the more cities that use development special 
districts to give special benefits to only certain private parties, 
the more the municipality inadvertently sends a message that it 
is in the business of selecting winners and losers—a form of crony 
capitalism.390 Some private groups will enjoy infrastructure 
subsidies, direct grants, tax breaks, and, in this case, special 
taxing district financing, while others are “forced to shoulder the 
burden on their own without public assistance.”391 The effect that 
results is a certain discontent across the jurisdictional market 
that results in private businesses refusing to invest in the area 
out of bitterness that they have not received a public subsidy or 
out of a holdout mentality in refusing to invest until they too 
receive government assistance.392 
V. Recommendations for a Balancing of Interests 
Development special districts have the potential to serve a 
valid purpose.393 When used to truly help provide financing for 
                                                                                                     
 389. See id. (“While some groups enjoy infrastructure subsidies and breaks 
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Understanding (and Misunderstanding) Public Choice: A Response to Farber 
and Frickey, 66 TEX. L. REV. 993 (1998); Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer & 
Robert W. Vishny, Why Is Rent-Seeking so Costly to Growth?, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 
409 (1993); Maxwell L. Stearns, Restoring Positive Law and Economics: 
Introduction to Public Choice Theme Issue, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 709 (1998). 
 391. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 241 (“While some groups enjoy 
infrastructure subsidies and breaks from their tax obligations, others are forced 
to shoulder the burden on their own without public assistance.”). 
 392. See id. (“This creates a malaise throughout the municipality as private 
enterprise refuses to further invest within the city’s boundaries—either out of 
resentment or because they believe any such investment should be coupled with 
a public subsidy of their own.”).  
 393. See supra Part III.B (providing an overview of development special 
districts). 
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the development of areas that would otherwise be cut off from the 
lending market, their use is both legitimate and advantageous.394 
However, the desire of cities to draw in economic development 
projects and generate more tax revenue is too tempting.395 It 
takes very few steps and little administrative process to create a 
development special district.396 Moreover, it is all too easy for 
policymakers to convince themselves that the district’s debt has 
no negative impact on the surrounding community.397  
While the failure of the Beau Chateaux project is merely 
hypothetical, actual cases of development special district failures 
are not. In Florida alone, where development special districts are 
called community development districts, there were 594 districts 
created across the state.398 In 2010, 42% of these districts where 
either “defaulting or not collecting enough money to make their 
payments.”399 These 123 at-risk districts have issued a combined 
total of over $4 billion in bonded indebtedness, which has been 
spread to financial houses, pension funds, and other large 
institutional investors across the country.400  
One district in particular exemplifies the abuse.401 The 
Arlington Ridge community development district in Leesburg 
issued $16 million worth of bonds.402 This was used to support not 
only traditional infrastructure, but also a community restaurant 
                                                                                                     
 394. See supra Part III (discussing the special taxing district). 
 395. See supra Part II.C (discussing the economic and financial pressures of 
local governments as a result of the economic crisis). 
 396. See supra Part III.A (discussing the history and uses of special taxing 
districts). 
 397. See supra Part III (discussing the special taxing district concept). 
 398. See Ritchie, supra note 22 (discussing community development districts 
in Lake County, Florida, and across the state during the financial crisis). 
 399. See id. (“Today, Florida has 294 of these powerful districts that have 
borrowed billions by issuing bonds, and 123 of those—42 percent—are either 
defaulting or aren’t collecting enough money to make their payments . . . .”). 
 400. See id. (“So how much do the 123 districts combined owe bondholders? 
Nearly $4 billion.”). 
 401. See id. (“Life at the Arlington Ridge retirement community south of 
Leesburg was considerably cushier before the developer went belly up.”). 
 402. See id. (“Thanks to the greedy way Blair Communities financed the 
project, retirees who live on about 235 of the lots now are stuck with $15.9 
million in bond debt.”). 
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and other luxuries such as a social coordinator and a water 
aerobics instructor.403 Shortly “[a]fter selling about 235 of the 
planned 1,036 lots in the 487-acre project, developer Blair 
Communities went belly up.”404 The effects of a failed 
development of this size, aside from the consequences to the 
homeowners and the investors, on the surrounding community 
can result in shock waves of economic depression and downturn 
as businesses and new investors flee from the area.405  
The negative consequences that follow this free flowing 
public subsidy, particularly in the face of increasing municipal 
pressures to bring in new businesses, are substantial and have 
the potential to be even more so.406 Recognizing the problems and 
stemming the damage is becoming tremendously important.407 
A. Solution 1: Contractual Cures 
One possible way to deal with the issue of the subordination 
of vested property rights and its impact on the real estate lending 
market would be to include an automatic default provision in all 
conventional lending documents.408  
                                                                                                     
 403. See id. (“‘We had a restaurant, full-time instructors for water aerobics, 
full-time security, social coordinators—they’re all gone,’ said Dominic Setaro, 62, 
a retired government finance officer.”); White, supra note 8 (discussing the 
struggles of homeowners in failed tax districts). 
 404. Ritchie, supra note 22. 
 405. See id. (“The defaults are leaving folks like Setaro to uproot their 
retirement and fend for themselves in a morass of complicated government 
finance involving these so-called ‘dirty bonds.’ And they aren’t the only ones 
hurt.”).  
 406. See supra Part IV (discussing the various unintended consequences of 
development special districts). 
 407. See supra Part IV (discussing the urgency needed to address the 
various unintended consequences of development special districts). 
 408. For a discussion of contractual mortgage provisions, see Michael B. 
Mierzewski, Beth S. DeSimone & Tengfei (Harry) Wu, New Law’s Mortgage 
Provisions Affect Lenders, Mortgage Brokers, Appraisers, Settlement Service 
Providers, and Others, 127 BANKING L.J. 702 (2000). 
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1. Implementing a Private Law Fix 
In other words, using the example of Beau Chateaux, when 
Realty Bank first made the land loan to the developer, it could 
have provided in the loan agreement or mortgage contract that, 
in the event the borrower allows any special taxing district lien to 
attach to the mortgaged property without the mortgagee’s 
consent, then this shall constitute an automatic default. By doing 
so, the real estate lender would be able to anticipate beforehand 
the chance that the developer would obtain special district 
financing and thus diminish the value of the bank’s mortgage.409 
Therefore, if the developer intended to obtain financing 
through a development special district, then he would first have 
to consult with his mortgage lender. In doing so, the mortgage 
lender would review the financial projections, economic studies, 
and other relevant information in connection with the magnitude 
of the proposed bond issuance and thereby police how much debt 
the special district would incur.410 The lender would consent to 
the creation of the district if and only if the borrower agreed to 
follow what the bank dictates in issuing the bonds.411 
2. Pondering the Drawbacks of Contract 
However, there is a major drawback to this particular 
solution. First, the way in which special districts are created 
poses some problems insofar as lender’s counsel has the ability to 
craft the appropriate language.412 For one, it would be difficult to 
define and quantify when exactly a developer would “allow” a 
special taxing district lien to attach to the mortgaged property.413 
The local government is the body that creates the special 
                                                                                                     
 409. See generally Christine M. Gimeno & Tammy E. Hinshaw, Mortgage 
Acceleration Clauses, 41 OHIO JUR. 3D ESTATES, ETC. § 262 (West 2014). 
 410. See generally Callies, supra note 27. 
 411. See generally id. 
 412. See supra Part III.B (providing an overview of development special 
districts). 
 413. See supra Part III.B.  
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district.414 Although some statutory schemes require the 
landowner (developer) to file a petition, there are cases where the 
local government can, on its own, initiate the creation of the 
district.415 Also, if the legislature creates the district via a special 
act, then the developer is not formally involved at all. So if one 
cannot quantify the developer’s formal role in creating the 
district, can the lender expect its remedy to be triggered by 
informal acts?416 If the developer writes to a legislator and asks 
her to sponsor a bill to create the development special district, 
does this constitute a default? What if the request to the 
legislator is made in the form of a conversation? Is it only a 
matter of proof now?  
And what about other types of special taxing districts aside 
from the development special district? What if the locality votes 
to increase the property taxes in connection with the area’s sewer 
district or fire district?417 Would this constitute a default? It is, 
technically speaking, allowing the mortgaged property to be 
encumbered by a special district lien.418 If there were a local 
election regarding the increase in the fire protection district’s 
assessment, would the developer be compelled to vote against it 
in order not to violate the loan covenants? The issues raised here 
are difficult ones because the circumstances under which special 
districts arise can be so varied. This is particularly true because 
it is not the developer who legally creates the district.419 Rather, 
it is a third party—the local government or the state legislature—
who does so, and they are not bound by any special relationship 
with the developer’s lender.420 So, while a private law solution 
between the parties might have the potential to resolve some of 
                                                                                                     
 414. See supra Part III.B.  
 415. See supra Part III.B. 
 416. See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3052 (discussing the benefits to 
developers of using special law MUDs). 
 417. See supra Part III.A (discussing the history and uses of special taxing 
districts). 
 418. See supra Part III.A (discussing special taxing districts).  
 419. See supra Part II.B (providing an overview of development special 
districts). 
 420. For more information on development special districts, see supra Part 
III.B. 
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the problems, it cannot be expected to serve as a comprehensive 
remedy. 
B. Solution 2: Statutory Limitations 
Statutory solutions also present a possible remedy to the 
problems related to the rampant creation of development special 
districts. In most cases, there are little to no statutory or 
constitutional parameters imposed on legislatures or local 
governments in their ability to create special taxing districts.421 
There is no formal process of deliberation, nor is there a list of 
factors that the legislative body must consider when determining 
whether to convey to a private party (or any party) the benefits of 
a special taxing district.422 
1. Enacting Legislative Parameters 
At the local government level, the developer and his 
architects, planners, and attorneys woo the city council or county 
commission with promises of high-end developments that will 
result in large tax revenues.423 While the council may engage in 
some deliberative processes as to the merits of the project, studies 
have shown that more often than not the passage of ordinances 
creating such districts happens as a matter of course.424 And 
those development special districts created by legislative act are 
even more easily obtained.425 With so many members in the state 
house from so many far off corners of the state, it is easy to 
surmise that few (if any) will actively spar with the bill sponsor 
as to the legitimacy of a development special district in a 
particular far-flung town or county.  
A possible solution might involve amending special taxing 
district statutes in every state to provide that the legislative 
                                                                                                     
 421. See supra Part III.B (explaining development special districts). 
 422. See supra Part III.B. 
 423. See supra Part III.B. 
 424. See supra Part III.B. 
 425. See supra Part III.B. 
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body—whether state-wide or local—must review certain factors 
before approving a new special district, or perhaps that the body 
can only create special districts that meet certain criteria.426 In 
the best case scenario, the development special district would 
only be used in those instances where the project could not occur 
without public support and that the project furthers the goals of 
ameliorating an economically depressed or underserved area. 
2. Remembering the Inevitability of Discretion 
However, the problem with this approach is that a 
determined and resolute legislative body that is intent on 
conferring the favored party with a special taxing district subsidy 
will find a way to justify the district’s creation, even if it does not 
actually meet the criteria. When cities and municipalities are 
being pushed to drive economic growth and to spur new jobs and 
investment, there is little chance that local government decision 
makers—much less state legislators—will truly evaluate each 
development special district request with a discerning eye.427 The 
developer would argue that the project is not possible without the 
subsidy because he is financially unable (or unwilling) to 
shoulder the burden of obtaining conventional financing. Or, 
perhaps he would argue that financing is not available or 
practical.  
The council, in turn, would argue that the granting of the 
district does indeed help ameliorate an economically depressed 
area. If a previously undeveloped area becomes a booming 
neighborhood or commercial hub then, under a rising-tides-raise-
all-ships theory, nearby underserved and depressed areas would 
benefit from the spill-over effect. And the local government would 
further declare that the revenues produced from the new tax base 
would be used to focus additional public subsidies to these 
                                                                                                     
 426. See, e.g., Zale, supra note 81, at 87 (“This article argues that before 
exercising the right to destroy as a property owner, a city should conduct a 
demolition review procedure targeted at evaluating the impacts of the proposed 
exercise of the right to destroy on the city’s resiliency.”). 
 427. See supra Part II and accompanying discussion of pressures put on 
American cities post the Great Recession. 
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underserved areas in the future. With so many economic and 
political pressures facing cities today in terms of their role in the 
economic recovery, it is of little doubt that every development 
special district request would meet whatever criteria or narrow 
purpose the lawmaker could craft.428 
C. Solution 3: Adopting a Two-Pronged Jurisprudential Approach 
While a private law or contract-based solution has 
limitations, and while a statutory cabining of authority in 
relation to the creation of special districts has its weaknesses as 
well, there is another solution that could prove effective. This 
solution involves the adoption of a doctrine of equitable 
subordination by courts in dealing with a competition between 
development special district liens and pre-existing mortgage 
rights. As discussed above, the superpriority status accorded to 
the special district lien is what causes most of the problems.429 
But if there were a way for courts to police situations whereby 
special district liens were used in overreaching ways to the 
prejudice of the pre-existing rights of third parties, then 
developers and special district boards would be less motivated to 
abuse the device.  
In other words, the developer would not be inclined to 
overreach in the issuing of the bonds for mere luxuries and 
amenities, nor would he try to obtain a special district for the 
development of an area that was already prime for development, 
if he would not be able to validly market to bondholders that they 
would have a first priority lien to secure their investments.430 The 
bondholders will be less enthusiastic in investing in the project if 
they believe that their rights to repayment might be subordinated 
to the interests of another creditor (like Realty Bank).431 Through 
                                                                                                     
 428. See supra Part II.A (discussing the effects of the economic crisis on local 
governments). 
 429. See supra Part IV (discussing the various unintended consequences of 
development special districts). 
 430. See supra Part III.B (explaining development special districts). 
 431. For more information on development special districts, see supra Part 
III.B. 
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this system, market forces would disincentivize the developer 
from being overly aggressive in his use of the development special 
districts.432  
The test would work as follows: when confronted with 
competing secured parties—the bondholders or district and their 
or its liens on the one hand, and the real estate lender’s mortgage 
on the other—the court would engage in a two-step process of 
determining whether the superpriority status of the special 
district’s lien should be respected or whether it should be 
subordinated to the pre-existing mortgage. 
1. The Stand-on-Your-Own Prong 
The first part of the test involves the court analyzing the 
“stand on your own” prong. Under this study, the court looks to 
whether the project could have been accomplished through the 
use of non-development special district financing. In other words, 
could the developer have obtained conventional financing or 
equity financing through traditional channels and achieved the 
same result as he did using the special district? 
This inquiry would be challenged or substantiated through 
market analyses as to whether the area was prime for 
development or merely speculative, through economic studies to 
show the likelihood of a return on investment, and through an 
exploration of the creditworthiness of the borrower versus the 
amount of risk a conventional lender would be willing to bear 
based on the market and the type and scope of the project. If the 
answer was determined to be yes—that the project could have 
been accomplished using non-development special district 
financing—then the liens in connection with the district’s debt 
should be subordinated to the rights of the pre-existing 
mortgagee. But if the answer was no—the project would not have 
been possible without the special district benefit—then the court 
would move on to the second prong. 
                                                                                                     
 432. See supra Part III.B (providing an overview of development special 
districts). 
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2. The Community Benefits Prong 
The second part of the test is the “community benefits” 
prong. This prong involves the court asking whether the benefits 
conferred on the parcels within and by virtue of the special taxing 
district inure to the measurable benefit of an economically 
distressed area. The purpose here is to decipher whether, if the 
project in its current iteration could only have been achieved 
through the use of a development special district, this project 
actually benefits, in an assessable way, an economically troubled 
area. 
This would be determined based on substantiated evidence of 
tangible benefits to an economically distressed area that is either 
within or near the development special district. In other words, 
does the development bring jobs, blight improvement, or other 
economic benefits to an area that is in need of investment, 
resources, and opportunity? These benefits cannot be merely 
abstract or intangible. There must be actual data and tangible 
evidence that support realistic projections as to the benefits that 
will accrue to the target area. And it is not enough that these 
benefits exist, but they must actually impact an economically 
distressed area. This might include a portion of the locality that 
is blighted, historically undeveloped or underdeveloped, 
populated with a high number of low-income individuals, or that 
suffers from a number of at-risk factors. 
 If the answer is yes—the project does indeed measurably 
benefit an economically distressed area—then the superpriority 
of the special district lien should be respected. However, if the 
answer is no, then the lien should be subordinated to the pre-
existing rights of any mortgagees. 
By creating such a framework, courts would be equipped 
with a tool for policing the inappropriate use of development 
special districts. The test does not invalidate the district as a 
whole or call into question the validity or the wisdom of its 
creation. Rather, it merely assesses, based on measurable factors, 
whether it would be constitutionally appropriate to subordinate 
the pre-existing property rights of secured parties to the district’s 
rights in the property. Further, the test provides flexibility in 
that if only a portion of the district’s financing is used for an 
improvement or infrastructure project that fails to meet the test, 
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while another portion of the financing satisfies the two prongs, 
then a value-to-value subordination of the lien could occur. This 
would allow for the bifurcation of the lien’s superpriority status 
so as not to unduly injure true community benefits resulting from 
the special district along with those benefits that are purely 
private.433 
3. A Comparison to Other Equitable Doctrines 
Moreover, such flexible tests are not without precedent in 
American law. United States courts have long employed various 
judicially created tests to help balance the interests of private 
parties, even when they do not produce a bright-line rule. In the 
bankruptcy context, federal courts use a theoretically similar, 
although structurally different, form of equitable subordination 
when a superior bankruptcy claimant acts in such a way as to 
injure the rights of junior creditors.434 In these cases, the court 
can subordinate the superior creditor’s claim to that of the junior 
creditor or force all other creditors—secured and unsecured—to 
be paid first before any payments are made to the bad-acting 
superior creditor.435 In essence, this much broader authority 
allows federal bankruptcy judges to strip a valid lien of all its 
power and authority over collateral.436 And while this power is 
                                                                                                     
 433. See supra Part III (discussing the special taxing district). 
 434. See 1 BAXTER DUNAWAY, LAW DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE § 7:57 (West 
2014) (discussing bankruptcy courts’ use of equitable subordination in cases 
when bankruptcy claimants act in ways to injure the rights of junior creditors). 
 435. See Jeremy W. Dickens, Equitable Subordination and Analogous 
Theories of Lender Liability: Toward a New Model of ‘Control,’ 65 TEX. L. REV. 
801, 802 (1987) (explaining the various instances in which equitable 
subordination could be employed by the court). 
 436. See Rafael Ignacio Pardo, Note, Beyond the Limits of Equity 
Jurisprudence: No-Fault Equitable Subordination, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489, 1490 
(2000) (“[T]he purpose of the [equitable subordination] doctrine is ‘to reprioritize 
the order of allowed claims based on the equities of the case, rather than to 
allow or disallow the claim in the first instance.’”); Andrew DeNatale & 
Prudence B. Abram, The Doctrine of Equitable Subordination as Applied to 
Nonmanagement Creditors, 40 BUS. LAW. 417, 428 (1985) (“[T]he court generally 
may award any relief that it deems appropriate to undo the wrong and ensure 
that the liquidation results are equitable. This relief can include voiding of 
liens . . . .”). 
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vaguely provided for in § 510(c) of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code,437 it has generally been held to be within the providence of 
the courts to define its parameters and develop its usages.438 
At the state court level, the doctrine of unconscionability 
serves as yet another example of how judges have shown a 
propensity to engage in the extra-statutory policing of private 
contracts. The doctrine of unconscionability can be traced back to 
early English law, which sought to provide prohibitions for 
certain contracts that “no man in his senses and not under 
delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair 
man would accept on the other.”439 Since that time, a multitude of 
American states have utilized this principle, as well as the 
United States Supreme Court.440 Courts have often declared that 
the power to police private contracts in this manner is part of the 
judiciary’s inherent and intrinsic powers.441 Consequently, the 
                                                                                                     
 437. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2012) (detailing the court’s granted power of 
equitable subordination). 
 438.  For case law on this issue, see Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 
(1939); Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 323 (1939); Citicorp 
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David v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 287 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Civ. Ct. 1968), rev’d on 
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 441. See generally Evelyn L. Brown, The Uncertainty of U.C.C. Section 2-
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power is not derived from legislation, but rather from general 
jurisprudential and constitutional principles that allow the 
judiciary to refuse to enforce unfair contracts or provisions that 
are deemed too burdensome, onerous, or one-sided.442 Courts 
generally look for evidence of overreaching by one party who is in 
a superior bargaining position to the disadvantage of another 
party who is in an inferior position due to education, language, 
economic status, or social demographic.443 And although UCC 
Article 2 codified the doctrine of unconscionability, it had long 
existed under, and continues to be developed purely by, the 
judiciary.444 
Just as these equitable doctrines have allowed courts to 
interpose fairness and equity between private parties, the two-
pronged test articulated above could be similarly used to help 
ward off the harms that arise from development special district 
abuse. By ensuring that over-reaching developers are unable to 
bank on the unfettered use of development special districts and 
their superpriority liens, market forces and considerations of risk 
will ultimately scale back the aggressive use of these devices for 
purely private developments and better encourage their use for 
true community development that inures to the benefit of the 
wider public. 
                                                                                                     
302: Why Unconscionability Has Become a Relic, 105 COMM. L.J. 287 (2000). 
 442. See id. at 287–88 (“One such [judicial] tool is 
unconscionability, . . . used since at least the eighteenth century to ‘police’ 
contracts that are grossly unfair and one-sided.”). 
 443. See id. at 298 (“A court is to consider factors such as the age, literacy, 
and business sophistication of the party claiming unconscionability; the 
bargaining tactics of the other party to the contract; and the commercial setting 
of the sales contract.”).  
 444. See Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—
The Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 8 (2012) 
(“The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code sanctioned the doctrine of 
unconscionability in Article 2, but did not define the term or establish a 
framework for its implementation. . . . The drafters of section 2-302 
intentionally left the task of defining unconscionability . . . to the courts.”). 
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VI. Conclusion 
As cities continue to scramble for new sources of tax revenue 
in this post-recession economy, the magnitude and pace of 
municipal competition will only continue to rise and become more 
intense.445 To that end, the use of public incentive packages and 
other subsidy offerings as a tool to lure economic development 
projects to a given locale will also continue to rise.446 The special 
taxing district has already been shown to be a powerful tool in 
the city’s arsenal, and municipalities have evidenced a 
willingness in the past to distribute these public subsidy devices 
to aid developers in financing their various projects.447 
However, the unintended consequences of the use of special 
taxing districts in this manner cannot be understated.448 First, 
the liens they produce undermine vested property rights without 
any of the protections accorded under traditional due process and 
deprivation of property analyses.449 Parties with superior rights 
in property, such as mortgagees and first secured parties, are 
unjustly subordinated to the rights of the later arising special 
district lien merely because the enabling statutes accord them the 
same status as ad valorem property taxes.450 However, this 
superpriority is misplaced because although traditional property 
taxes support a broad array of public goods and services, the 
                                                                                                     
 445. See supra Part II (“As cities and municipalities across the United 
States became zealous in their desire to attract new residents and to land 
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 446. See supra Part III (“It is through these economic and social pressures 
that local government decision-making has been steered precariously toward the 
creation of more and more special taxing districts as an instrument for 
economic, financial, and cultural viability, which has in turn served as an 
invitation for abuse and poor policymaking.”). 
 447. See supra Part III (providing information on the use of special taxing 
districts). 
 448. See supra Part IV (outlining the many unintended consequences of 
using special taxing districts to attract private developers). 
 449. Supra Part IV.A. 
 450. Supra Part IV.A. 
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resources and amenities supported by the special district liens 
are purely private.451  
Second, these development special district liens can have a 
substantially negative impact on the secondary mortgage 
market.452 As lenders can no longer be certain of their first 
position lien over the collateral, the ability to effectively market 
securities backed by these mortgages quickly becomes 
impossible.453 Secondary market firms such as Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac will likely refuse to purchase these securities due to 
the inferior position (as it has shown a history of doing under 
similar circumstances in the past), which could result in the 
entire secondary market abandoning these types of loans.454 And 
as primary lenders can no longer sell these mortgage loans on the 
secondary market, they will no longer be willing to lend in 
projects that are coupled with special taxing district financing, 
including projects in low-income and economically distressed 
areas where public subsidy financing of this sort is crucial.455 
Such a scenario is not merely hypothetical; rather, the exact same 
situation occurred a mere four years ago with the very similar 
PACE special taxing districts.456 
And lastly, the give-away of these special financing districts 
inherently creates a political dilemma as to the creation of 
winners and losers and the proliferation of a financial and risk-
based distortion in the local economy.457 By bestowing private 
benefits on only certain investors and businesses and not on 
                                                                                                     
 451. Supra Part IV.A. 
 452. See supra Part IV.B (“[O]ther creditors with vested property interests 
in the form of security rights are subordinated to the special district’s interest. 
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 455. Supra Part IV.B. 
 456. Supra Part IV.B. 
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others, a general climate of crony capitalism is created, which 
substantially undermines the goals of the resilient city.458  
A possible solution to this problem involving special taxing 
districts might entail the use of private law cures.459 In other 
words, mortgage lenders might attempt to contractually 
anticipate and prevent the creation of special taxing districts and 
the resulting damage to their collateral position.460 However, as 
discussed above, the ways in which various state and local laws 
dictate the creation of the districts make precise drafting almost 
impossible.461 Another solution might involve enacting public law 
parameters to hem in local governments and legislators from 
creating special districts when they are meant for purely private 
purposes.462 But such parameters, when so closely tied to the 
discretion of the lawmaker, will likely prove insufficient because 
a determined city council or legislature will find reasons—even if 
only superficial—to argue that the project has merit.463 Moreover, 
such an ex ante limitation may have the result of unduly 
questioning the validity of local government policymaking even 
when there does not yet exist a bona fide dispute among private 
parties as to their lien rights in property.464 
Finally, this Article argues for the adoption of a two-pronged 
jurisprudential test that seeks to provide a more nuanced 
framework to police the competing interests of lien claimants in 
the real-estate-related special taxing district context.465 For the 
special district lien to enjoy its superpriority, the test would 
require that the special district subsidy be necessary for the 
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to cure the defects of special taxing districts). 
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financial viability of the project and that the project create a 
tangible and measurable benefit to an economically distressed 
area or population.466 Such a test would allow an appropriate 
level of flexibility for the legitimate use of special taxing districts 
and would build upon a combination of other jurisprudential and 
discretional doctrines that already exist in American law.467 
Special taxing districts used for real estate developments have 
and can continue to play an important role in the recovery of the 
American economy.468 Areas that are hit the hardest, such as 
those that are economically distressed and where the cost of 
development is too high compared to the potential return, stand 
to benefit from such a public subsidy.469 However, this public 
benefit comes with consequences that, if abused, can unjustly 
harm private rights in property, diminish certain forms of 
community lending, and distort the field of equal economic 
opportunity in a given jurisdiction.470 Through the adoption of the 
flexible approach described above, to be administered under the 
neutral eye of the courts, the inherent lien priority contest 
involved in special district real estate projects can be moderated 
so as to maintain the integrity of this type of financing device.471 
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